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Seeking Remedies for LGBTQ
Children from Destructive Parental
Authority in the Era of Religious
Freedom
Roy Abernathy *
Abstract
This Note explores the intersection of parents’ rights,
religious rights, state’s rights, and children’s rights. This Note
analyzes the development of children’s rights and how those
rights may be applied to current state religious exemption
policies that affect the health of LGBTQ children. This Note will
argue that in the absence of direct federal legislation to stop the
harm of LGBTQ children, four possible remedies may exist to
protect LGBTQ children. These remedies include states
asserting parens
patriae authority,
children
asserting
substantive due process claims, children utilizing partial
emancipation statutes, or children utilizing mature minor
exemptions, which provide a judicial bypass procedure. This
Note posits that these remedies should be guaranteed for LGBTQ
minors when life-altering or life-endangering choices are made
by any parental figure or guardian.
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of Law. Thank you to the LGBT Bar Association for inspiring this Note topic
and to the various W&L professors who directed or edited aspects of the Note.
Thank you to my parents, who have made both their faith and supporting their
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I. Introduction
In October 2018, the New York Times published an article
titled, “‘Transgender’ Could Be Defined Out of Existence Under
Trump Administration.” 1 That headline encapsulates one of the
latest political attacks on the LGBTQ community. When the
Supreme Court recognized same-sex marriage in Obergefell v.

1.
See Erica L. Green et al., ‘Transgender’ Could Be Defined Out of
Existence Under Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/10/21/us/politics/transgender-trump-administrationsex-definition.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2020) (discussing the Trump
administration’s choice to define gender narrowly for application within
federal programs under Title IX) [https://perma.cc/UD8K-UHH3].
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Hodges, 2 the LGBTQ community rejoiced in victory. 3 However,
that valuable progress toward LGBTQ equality carries with it
the risk of victory blindness. 4 Since Obergefell, many states have
enacted various pieces of legislation to curtail the rights of the
LGBTQ community. 5 This Note specifically considers legislative
action that harms LGBTQ children.
Religious
Freedom
Restoration
Act
bills
allow
discrimination against LGBTQ children in the name of religious
freedom. 6 State bills have manifested in different ways to
specifically affect LGBTQ youth, such as anti-all-comers policies
in response to Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 7 limited
2.
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (“These
considerations lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a fundamental
right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the
same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”).
3.
See MICHELANGELO SIGNORILE, IT’S NOT OVER: GETTING BEYOND
TOLERANCE, DEFEATING HOMOPHOBIA, AND WINNING TRUE EQUALITY 180 (2016)
(“It was a profound and celebratory moment, and at Pride Month parades
across the country, many of us literally danced in the streets.”).
4.
See id. at 3 (describing victory blindness as a phenomenon which
occurs after a social group gains important strides toward success and turns a
blind eye to the continued discrimination occurring, illustrated by
anti-LGBTQ movements post-Obergefell when LGBTQ individuals were
paying less attention).
5.
See Michael Gordon et al., Understanding HB2: North Carolina’s
newest law solidifies state’s role in defining discrimination, THE CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER (Mar. 26, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.charlotteobserver.com
/news/politics-government/article68401147.html (updated Sept. 14, 2016) (last
visited Mar. 16, 2020) (discussing North Carolina’s bill reversing a Charlotte
ordinance that protected various rights of LGBTQ individuals, including
bathroom protections) [https://perma.cc/S2LV-KMMU].
6.
See CATHRYN OAKLEY, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND.,
DISREGARDING THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD: LICENSES TO DISCRIMINATE IN
CHILD WELFARE SERVICES 5–8 (2017) (discussing various state Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts providing opportunities for child welfare service
providers to discriminate against LGBTQ children).
7.
See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll.
of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 696 (2010) (affirming the
constitutionality of all-comers policies that require student organizations that
receive financial support to not discriminate against new members); see also
Kery Murakami, Tying Grant Eligibility to Religious Freedom, INSIDE HIGHER
ED (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/02/07/collegesworry-about-implications-religious-freedom-rule (last visited Mar. 6, 2020)
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public forum bills, 8 and religious exemptions for child welfare
service providers. 9
Religious exemptions for child welfare service providers
create an unfortunate opportunity for child welfare agencies to
discriminate under the guise of religion. 10 Various states have
privatized child welfare systems and private systems allow
providers to create their own set of principles to govern their
facilities. 11 During the latter half of the twentieth century,
states have trended toward privatized child welfare. 12
Provider-created
governing
principles
may
include
discriminatory policies allowed by religious exemptions, such as
a prohibition on same-sex couples adopting children or forced
conversion therapy and prohibition of hormone therapy for
foster children. 13
(discussing the current legal landscape for all-comers policies) [https://
perma.cc/98Z4-NAUU].
8.
See Ryan Wilson, HRC & Equality FL Express Concern for Overly
Broad Religious Expression Legislation in Florida, HUMAN RTS. CAMPAIGN
FOUND. (May 9, 2017), https://www.hrc.org/blog/hrc-equality-fl-expressconcern-for-overly-broad-religious-expression-legis (last visited Mar. 16, 2020)
(discussing broad state religious expression legislation that allows student
speakers to make anti-LGBTQ statements at school events pursuant to
personal religious beliefs) [https://perma.cc/SZ6M-LX96].
9.
See OAKLEY, supra note 6, at 3 (“At the close of 2017, seven states
have versions of license to discriminate in child welfare laws on the books—
three of which were passed in 2017 and five of which were passed in the last
three years.”).
10.
See id. (“Some providers of child welfare services, citing religious
objections, have threatened to cease providing state-funded services if they are
forced to serve same-sex couples or other potential parents seeking to adopt a
child . . . .”).
11.
See PLANNING AND LEARNING TECH., INC. & THE UNIV. OF KY.,
LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE PRIVATIZATION OF CHILD WELFARE SERVICES 1
(2006) (“Privatization is a process where functions and responsibilities in
whole or in part are shifted from government to the private sector.
Privatization can take various forms including vouchers and public-private
partnerships.”).
12.
See id. at 2 (“National surveys found that during the 1990s, between
50 percent to 80 percent of states had increased their reliance on contracted
social services to cope with new constraints on public resources.”).
13.
See OAKLEY, supra note 6, at 3 (“[T]heir purpose is to enshrine
discrimination into law by granting state contractors and grantees who
provide taxpayer-funded child welfare services the ability to discriminate with
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Religious exemptions for child welfare service providers
cast a larger spotlight on general parental authority, which may
be harmful to LGBTQ youth. LGBTQ children have,
unfortunately, found themselves in the crosshairs of the battle
over LGBTQ rights. 14 The safety of all LGBTQ children is
threatened by religious exemptions, and the fight against
religious exemptions has resulted in few successes. 15 The
development of children’s rights through direct legislation,
substantive due process claims, partial emancipation, or mature
minor exemptions will provide needed protection to LGBTQ
children, to keep them from unnecessary harm.
This Note will consider how parental authority can be
harmful for LGBTQ children within the child welfare system
and more broadly. In general, parents have the right to make
medical decisions on behalf of their children. 16 However, this
right is limited if the decision is harmful. 17 Legal challenges
may be necessary to remove discriminatory child welfare
policies; this Note focuses on remedies for the LGBTQ children
caught up in the child welfare system. Although the Note
focuses on LGBTQ children in the child welfare system, the
remedies discussed should translate to any LGBTQ children,
even those facing harmful parental authority outside of the
child welfare services context.
This Note will examine the development of children’s rights
and how those rights may be used to combat current religious
impunity in the provision of those services against qualified same-sex couples
or LGBTQ individuals who want to adopt.”).
14.
See id. at 5 (describing various state laws that allow child welfare
providers to discriminate in ways directly affecting LGBTQ children, including
one allowing the providers to “refus[e] to accept a referral for placement
services if the agency objects to the child or the likely placement of the child”).
15.
See id. at 8 (discussing the failure of discrimination-based challenges
to the growth of religious freedom protection statutes).
16.
See Douglas S. Diekema, Parental Decision Making, U. WASH., https://
depts.washington.edu/bhdept/ethics-medicine/bioethics-topics/detail/72 (last
visited Mar. 6, 2020) (describing the general freedom parents have to make
medical decisions for their children) [https://perma.cc/7YKB-XU7J].
17.
See id. (“Medical caretakers have an ethical and legal duty to
advocate for the best interests of the child when parental decisions are
potentially dangerous to the child’s health, imprudent, neglectful, or
abusive.”).
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exemption policies that target the health of LGBTQ children.
The Note will argue that, in the absence of direct legislation,
substantive due process claims, partial emancipation statutes,
or mature minor exemptions that provide a judicial bypass
procedure should be guaranteed for LGBTQ minors when lifealtering or life-endangering choices are made by any parental
figure or guardian. Part II begins with the historical background
of children’s rights and an overview of the constitutional
development of parental rights in the United States. Part II
considers parens patriae and the authority of the state, and
provides examples of state revocation of parental rights. Part II
concludes by discussing the independent rights of children and
the elimination of the parent–state dichotomy of control over
children. Part III analyzes risks and harms LGBTQ children
experience. Part III then discusses current child welfare service
laws that allow providers to discriminate against children on
the basis of religious and moral objections. Finally, Part IV
concludes by proposing four remedies to enhance children’s
rights for LGBTQ youth. These proposed remedies include state
intervention under parens patriae, substantive due process
claims, partial emancipation, and mature minor exemptions.
II. Historical Overview of the Contours of Children’s Rights
A. Parental Rights over Children Throughout United States
History
Children were considered the property of their parents or
the state—common law chattel—throughout much of the United
States’ history. 18 Parents exercised control over their children,
their commodity. 19 Historically, children had no rights at all. 20
At best, any rights afforded to children were secondary to

18.
See Kevin Noble Maillard, Rethinking Children As Property: The
Transitive Family, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 225, 237 (2010) (discussing the historic
view of children as parental property).
19.
See id. (stating children were viewed as a commodity where
ownership and dominion would be presumed).
20.
See id. (“At common law, children were treated as chattel.”).
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parental authority and state control. 21 Debates about children’s
rights traditionally focused on parents as the property owner,
and the state as the property giver. 22
Children were viewed as an economic asset of their parents
until the late eighteenth century. 23 Children worked for the
economic well-being of their families, whether on a farm or a
trade apprenticeship in the community. 24 Children’s work was
to financially benefit their parents, generally through the age of
twenty-one. 25 The level of control exerted over children was
reinforced by community and religious values, ensuring
children were both maintained and controlled. 26
In the early nineteenth century, the status of child labor
began to change due to overall economic growth in society. 27
Children left home to work in factories at young ages. 28 Thus
emerged the doctrine of emancipation: releasing a child from
economic servitude to the family and releasing the parent from
the responsibility of supporting the child. 29 Respublica v.

21.
See id. (recognizing that throughout the United States’ history
children had very few rights and those that were recognized would be
considered less controlling than a parental property right).
22.
See id. at 227 (discussing the child as owned by the parent or state
when determining property claims).
23.
See F. Raymond Marks, Detours on the Road to Maturity: A View of
the Legal Conception of Growing Up and Letting Go, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer, 1975, at 80 (discussing historical assumptions that adult economic
roles applied equally to children).
24.
See id. (stating no matter the field of work a child may be engaged
with, either directly for a parent or for another master, the pay was provided
to a parent or guardian).
25.
See id. (discussing the economic control of children extended until the
age of twenty-one).
26.
See id. (highlighting community goals to keep children from becoming
a public charge or a public nuisance which was the subject of “stubborn
children” laws, the antecedent to minors in need of supervision jurisdiction).
27.
See id. at 81 (recognizing the effect technological growth during the
industrial era had on children utilized in the labor market).
28.
See id. (discussing the young ages at which children would leave home
to work in the factory setting).
29.
See id. at 82 (highlighting the emergence of emancipation of children
as a byproduct of children leaving home to work in factories).
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Keppele 30 is an early example of courts considering limitations
on parental rights to bind the child to work. 31 During this time,
the age of maturity became flexible and child runaway laws
were no longer enforced. 32 Although the colonial period
recognized strict parental control, the early nineteenth century
provided for early maturation of children and a rise in
recognition of a child’s right to seek emancipation. 33
The close of the nineteenth century brought
industrialization and the rise of the nuclear family. 34 The
nuclear family emphasized a prolonged role for parents in the
preparation of children. 35 Three major legal and political
moves—the creation of the juvenile court system, enactment of
child labor laws, and the development of compulsory
education—expanded the realm of parental control and delayed
economic roles for children. 36 Although these new institutions
were generally motivated by economic interests, their
development provided many initial protections and guarantees
for children. 37

30.
See Respublica v. Keppele, 2 U.S. 197, 199 (Pa. 1793) (concluding that
overseers of minors do not have authority to bind minors to indentured
servanthood).
31.
See id. at 198 (providing that parental authority was limited by social
customs, specifically applied as a limitation for parents to bind their children
as a servant).
32.
See Marks, supra note 23, at 83 (considering the young age many
children were leaving home to seek work, a minor’s right to depart from his
parent’s home was recognized and child neglect laws were not applied in these
situations).
33.
See id. at 85 (contrasting the differences in colonial era and
mid-eighteenth century parental authority).
34.
See id. at 86 (discussing the period of 1870–1920 as the industrial era
when the nuclear family concept began to develop).
35.
See id. (discussing value in parental identity shifting to parental
ability to prepare children for success).
36.
See id. at 86–88 (acknowledging the legislative development of the
juvenile court system, child labor laws, and compulsory education provided
greater parental authority over children even as the children grew older).
37.
See id. at 87–88 (analyzing the economic motivations behind the
establishment of child labor laws, the juvenile court system, and compulsory
education).
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By the early twentieth century, the trend toward children
having an independent status slowed. 38 Compulsory education
laws turned schools into social institutions that would prepare
children for their adult lives. 39 The time frame for adult
preparation expanded, a phenomenon unique to the modern
era. 40
B. Constitutional Foundations for the Fundamental Right of
Parents to Control the Upbringing of Their Children
1. The Origin of Constitutional Parental Rights and Seminal
Cases Relating to Such Rights
Throughout the early twentieth century, the effects of
industrialization and the nuclear family led to powerful
parental authority. 41 The Supreme Court responded by
guaranteeing a constitutional right for parents to raise their
children free from government intervention in Meyer v.
Nebraska 42 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters 43 in the 1920s. 44

38.
See id. at 88 (concluding that the shift away from economic roles for
adolescents eroded the right to emancipation that had developed in the
eighteenth century for adolescents).
39.
See id. (“[T]hey sought to designate the school as the social institution
other than the family that would formally prepare him for life.”).
40.
See id. (“With the passage of child labor legislation, the prolongation
of childhood was facilitated. Henceforward, adult economic roles would be out
of reach of adolescents, and adolescence would be more clearly defined as a
formal and dependent period of life.”).
41.
See id. at 86 (analyzing how the limitations due to child labor laws
and compulsory school attendance force youth to obey parents with no
practical alternative).
42.
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (concluding
Nebraska law restricting foreign language classes violated the Fourteenth
Amendment).
43.
See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (concluding
that Oregon’s Compulsory Education Act unreasonably interferes with
parental rights).
44.
See id. at 535 (“The child is not the mere creature of the state; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to prepare him for additional obligations.”); see also Meyer, 262 U.S. at
403 (“We are constrained to conclude that the statute as applied is arbitrary

SEEKING REMEDIES FOR LGBTQ CHILDREN

635

These cases struck down compulsory education laws, which had
become universal in the United States. 45 The fundamental
rights of parents in U.S. law, specifically parental discretion in
child rearing, were established in the context of ensuring
adequate education. 46 “The Child is not the mere creature of the
state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him
for additional obligations.” 47 Pierce discusses the state’s
relinquishment of total rights over children and the state’s
grant of those rights to the parent. 48 This transferal of rights
provides parents the liberty to act on behalf of their children and
have no fear of legislative interference with their parental rights
without a competent state purpose. 49
The Supreme Court advanced the concept of fundamental
parental rights through a substantive due process analysis
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 50 The fundamental parental
rights established in Meyer and Pierce have been upheld
throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 51 The
Court has repeatedly acknowledged the primacy of the role of

and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the
State.”).
45.
See Marks, supra note 23, at 88 (stating in 1890 twenty-nine states
had adopted compulsory education laws, extending to every state by 1918).
46.
See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 531–33 (challenging the Oregon Compulsory
Education Act requiring public education for children age eight to sixteen if
adequate alternatives are available).
47.
Id. at 535.
48.
See id. at 534–35 (discussing the right of States to provide public
education and the distinct right of parents to direct the child’s education).
49.
See id. at 535 (“[R]ights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be
abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the state.”).
50.
See C.P. Dominic Ayotte, Troxel v. Granville: Parental Power to
Determine Associational Interests of Children, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 997, 1003
(2000) (recognizing a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment granted through various Supreme Court holdings).
51.
Cf. id. (discussing the seminal cases Meyer and Pierce, as well as
providing citations to other cases that have defined the contours of parental
rights).

636

26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 625 (2020)

parents in the upbringing of their children. 52 “We have
recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between
parent and child is constitutionally protected.” 53
Government authorities may not break up families without
a showing of parental unfitness and consideration of the best
interest of the child. 54 Parents may decide on a course of action
that is not agreeable to their children or has inherent risk. 55
Children and parents maintain an interest in continuing their
natural relationship. 56 The best interest of the child standard
does not always govern parents’ custody because as long as
minimal requirements of child care are met, the interest of the
child may be subordinated to other interests. 57 Notably, Troxel
52.
See Ayotte, supra note 50, at 1003 (“The primacy of the individual—
that is, a parent or parents—in all matters of childrearing has been alluded to
repeatedly.”).
53.
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (citing Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 US. 205, 231–33 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651–52
(1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–401 (1923)).
54.
See id. (describing the importance of the family unit and the child’s
best interest test). The Court stated:
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended
if a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family,
over the objections of the parents and their children, without some
showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was
thought to be in the children’s best interest.
Id. (citations omitted).
55.
See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (“Simply because the
decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does
not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the parents
to some agency or officer of the state.”).
56.
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982) (“[U]ntil the State
proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in
preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.”).
57.
See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993) (noting the best interest
of the child test is not always the legal standard). The court stated:
“[T]he best interests of the child” is not the legal standard that
governs parents’ or guardians’ exercise of their custody: so long as
certain minimum requirements of child care are met, the interests
of the child may be subordinated to the interests of other children,
or indeed even to the interests of the parents or guardians
themselves.
Id.
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v. Granville 58 found that a parent’s choice to limit third-party
visitation was a valid exercise of parental authority. 59 Troxel
explicitly recognized a fundamental parental right based on the
history of parental interest in raising children within the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 60 The parental
authority to make decisions regarding care, custody, and control
of children is thoroughly rooted in constitutional
jurisprudence. 61
2. The Coupling of the Right to Parent and the Right to Freely
Exercise Religion
Claims for parental rights often coincide with religious
freedom. The First Amendment establishes the right to the free
exercise of religion. 62 In Reynolds v. United States, 63 the Court
ruled that the Free Exercise Clause protects religious beliefs
against regulation. 64 However, the Free Exercise Clause does
not protect actions based on religious beliefs from regulation, if
the regulation is neutral on its face. 65 The Court in Reynolds
58.
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000) (concluding that a
Washington state law allowing third parties to petition for visitation over
parental objections was an unconstitutional infringement on parental rights).
59.
See id. at 67–69 (disagreeing with a Washington state statute
allowing a judge to give no deference to a parent’s estimation of her child’s best
interest).
60.
See id. at 65 (“The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest
of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”).
61.
See id. (discussing the fundamental nature and jurisprudential
history of the right to control the upbringing of one’s child).
62.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
63.
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (concluding
that a law banning polygamy did not infringe upon the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment).
64.
See id. at 165–66 (describing polygamy as an unconstitutional
unprotected religious action rather than a constitutionally protected religious
belief).
65.
See id. at 166 (arguing polygamy had always been “an offense against
society” and therefore not an action protected under the First Amendment and
punishable by statute if it is broadly applied).
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ensured that religious beliefs could not become superior to the
law of the land. 66
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
of Oregon v. Smith, 67 the Court returned to and relied upon the
Reynolds standard. 68 Before that decision, Supreme Court
jurisprudence had begun to suggest that a plaintiff’s case
regarding religious actions may be successful under a Free
Exercise Clause exemption. 69 In Employment Division, the
Court restored the distinction between religious belief and
religious action, finding religious-based actions are not
protected under a generally neutral law. 70 Under Employment

66.
See id. at 167 (“To permit this would be to make the professed
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”).
67.
See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
882 (1990) (holding the Reynolds standard was appropriate, thus Oregon is
not prohibited under the Free Exercise Clause from maintaining facially
neutral laws regulating actions), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714–15 (2005).
68.
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (finding the Reynolds standard to provide
the appropriate distinction between protecting religious belief and religiously
motivated action).
69.
See Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 716 (1970)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a regulation neutral on its face will
still run afoul of the Establishment Clause if it unduly burdens the free
exercise of religion); see also Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When A “Rule”
Doesn’t Rule: The Failure of the Oregon Employment Division v. Smith
“Hybrid Rights Exception,” 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 573, 579 (2003) (“On Oregon’s
appeal, the claimants likely felt confident that the Court’s prior free exercise
jurisprudence in the area of unemployment compensation would lead to
affirmance.”).
70.
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (addressing that religious based actions
may be regulated by the government if the regulation is neutral). The Court
stated:
Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply, that when otherwise
prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious conviction, not
only the convictions but the conduct itself must be free from
governmental regulation. We have never held that, and decline to
do so now. There being no contention that Oregon’s drug law
represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the
communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one’s children
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Division, religious-based actions are only protected if the hybrid
rights exception is applicable. 71 The hybrid rights exception
requires that a free exercise claim be coupled with another
constitutional protection, such as parental rights, before the
court strikes down a neutral and generally applicable law. 72
The hybrid rights exception was short-lived. It was
preempted three years later by the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (hereinafter “RFRA”). 73 The Court’s
abandonment of the compelling state interest test in favor of a
rule allowing restrictions as long as the restrictions were not
targeted at a specific religious group was unpopular. 74 An
unexpected bipartisan alliance, which included both prominent
Christian religious organizations and the American Civil
Liberties Union, developed to implement RFRA, which passed
with a vote of ninety-seven to three in the Senate. 75

Id.

in those beliefs, the rule to which we have adhered ever since
Reynolds plainly controls.

71.
See Aden & Strang, supra note 69, at 580 (stating the Free Exercise
Clause absolutely protects religious beliefs and actions prohibited solely
because of religious motivation, but only protects against generally applicable
laws if another constitutional protection was involved).
72.
See id. (“The Court synthesized its prior free exercise jurisprudence,
stating that past cases that had required exemptions from neutral, generally
applicable laws presented ‘hybrid situation[s]’ where there was a free exercise
claim connected with a ‘communicative activity or parental right.’”) (citations
omitted).
73.
See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714–15 (2005) (stating that the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act was implemented in response to the Dep’t
of Human Res. of Oregon decision); see also Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2000bb-4 (1993) (stating the exact requirements by
which the “Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion”).
74.
See Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/17/us/clintonsigns-law-protecting-religious-practices.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2020)
(discussing the immediate actions of “an unusual coalition of liberal,
conservative and religious groups that had pressed for the new law” which was
viewed as “the most significant piece of legislation dealing with our religious
liberty in a generation”) [https://perma.cc/83ZJ-Y53D].
75.
See id. (expressing the almost unanimous support as the House
passed the Act by a voice vote with no objections).
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Even though the original RFRA was a bipartisan effort with
good intentions, 76 after it was passed, the Free Exercise Clause
began to be weaponized. 77 Statutorily protected religious
freedom exemptions allowing discrimination against LGBTQ
children have resulted. 78 RFRA created the opportunity for
broad religious freedom exemption laws that discriminate
against LGBTQ individuals, without the hybrid rights
framework and Reynolds standard. 79
Even before RFRA, the Supreme Court had affirmed
parental rights in the context of religious claims in Wisconsin v.

76.
See id. (describing the support that the RFRA’s enactment enjoyed
across the political spectrum).
77.
See Adam Sonfield, In Bad Faith:
How Conservatives Are
Weaponizing “Religious Liberty” to Allow Institutions to Discriminate, 21
GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 23, 23 (2018) (“Social conservatives have fought for
extensive religious and moral exemptions for health care, educational, social
service and other institutions.”); see also Who is Weaponizing Religious
Liberty?, PEOPLE FOR THE AM. WAY, http://www.pfaw.org/report/who-isweaponizing-religious-liberty/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (discussing the over
one-hundred anti-equality bills targeting LGBTQ people in various state
legislatures, described as protecting religious freedom) [https://perma.cc
/J89W-EWZB].
78.
Compare Sonfield, supra note 77 (providing various reasons for the
original bill such as protecting minority religious groups from government
interests such as mandatory autopsies or zoning laws affecting places of
worship), with Oakley, supra note 6, at 3 (discussing the broad expansion of
religious freedom exemptions tailored specifically against the interests of
LGBTQ individuals).
79.
See, e.g., Brian Miller, The Age of RFRA, FORBES (Nov. 16, 2018, 3:46
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/briankmiller/2018/11/16/the-age-of-rfra
/#7f3e7da877ba (last visited Mar. 8, 2020) (discussing the use of the RFRA to
apply state laws that discriminate against LGBTQ individuals) [https://
perma.cc/RB26-VJJV]; TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.005(a) (West 2018) (“A
child welfare services provider may not be required to provide any service that
conflicts with the provider’s sincerely held religious beliefs.”); Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727–28
(2018) (analyzing whether store owners may refuse service to LGBTQ
individuals when claiming religious freedom exemptions and violations of
First Amendment protections); Wilson, supra note 8 (discussing a broad state
religious expression law allowing student speakers to make anti-LGBTQ
statements at school events pursuant to personal religious beliefs).
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Yoder. 80 Yoder considered the nexus of a religious exemption
under the Free Exercise Clause and the parental right to
determine a child’s upbringing. 81 Wisconsin’s compulsory school
attendance policy required children to attend public or private
school until the age of sixteen. 82 Members of the Old Order
Amish religion declined to send their children to school after the
eighth grade. 83 The parents objected to formal education after
eighth grade based on their sincerely held religious beliefs. 84
Yoder, consistent with Pierce, recognized the interest of a
state to provide universal education. 85 However, when a statute
impinges on fundamental rights such as religious freedom and
parental rights, the state must show an interest “of sufficient
magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under
the free exercise clause.” 86 The Court concluded that “however
strong the State’s interest in universal compulsory education, it
is by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all
other interests.” 87 Therefore, interests with significant
80.
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235–36 (1972) (concluding
Wisconsin’s compulsory education law violated the First Amendment rights of
the Amish).
81.
See id. at 233–34 (“[T]he power of the parent, even when linked to a
free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that
parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a
potential for significant social burdens.”).
82.
See id. at 207 n.2 (citing Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance
law, Wis. Stat. § 118.15, which required parents to send children between the
age of seven and sixteen to attend school regularly unless the child had legal
excuse or had graduated).
83.
Id. at 207.
84.
See id. at 210 (stating the Old Order Amish communities believe in a
fundamental salvation that requires community separate from worldly
influence and values).
85.
See id. at 213 (“There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a
high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable
regulations for the control and duration of basic education.”) (citations
omitted).
86.
See id. at 214 (discussing Pierce as an example where if parents are
meeting the obligations of education the right to direct the educational
upbringing of children will be left in the hands of the parents).
87.
See id. at 215 (arguing only interests of the most importance can
overcome claims to the free exercise of religion, which a state’s interest in
education will not always overcome).
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magnitude, such as the rights of parents alongside religious
rights, may outweigh the interests of the state. 88 Parental rights
coupled with claims of religious freedom provide a more
compelling argument against state regulation of children.
3. Yoder and the Implied Limits on Parental Rights
Even as the conception of children as property gave way to
more specific parental rights that would be constitutionally
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, these parental rights
had limitations. Yoder states that the rights of parents will not
be absolute, and may give way to concerns over the health and
safety of the child. 89 Additionally, parental rights will be
overcome by significant social burdens, such as the state’s
burden to educate future generations to become productive
members of society. 90 Both the concurring and dissenting
opinions in Yoder provide insight about concerns that amount
to significant social burdens.
Justice White’s concurrence analyzed the state interest in
providing education and concluded that education is the most
important function of the state. 91 The state’s interest is to
nurture and develop potential within children to prepare them
for a productive life. 92 It is possible that many Amish children
wish to continue living a simple rural life; however, some

88.
See id. (analyzing the Old Order Amish claims to the free exercise of
religion as an interest supreme to state regulated education).
89.
See id. at 233–34 (providing a two-part evaluation where parental
rights may be limited; first, if parental decisions jeopardize the health and
safety of the child, and second, if potentially significant social burdens exist).
90.
See id. (suggesting adequate education for children to become
self-supporting responsible citizens is a significant social burden, but the
Amish had not jeopardized this burden).
91.
See id. at 239 (White, J., concurring) (“Today, education is perhaps
the most important function of state and local governments.” (quoting Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954))).
92.
See id. at 240 (discussing the varied state interests that are met
through compulsory education such as increasing tolerance, strengthening
sensibility, and developing strengths in creativity and problem-solving).
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children abandon the Amish faith. 93 These children may wish to
eventually hold various other occupations and need to be
adequately prepared, instead of limited, by their parents’
choices. 94 Justice White considered the case close, but concluded
Wisconsin did not meet the burden to show forgoing one or two
additional years of school would be intellectually limiting for
children and thus did not hinder the legitimate state interest in
preparing children for future vocations. 95
Justice Douglas dissented in the Yoder decision, writing
that the decision to remove the child from school should not be
the parent’s choice alone. 96 Justice Douglas critiqued the
majority for assuming that the only two interests at stake were
those of the parents and those of the state. 97 Justice Douglas
stated “the parents [were] seeking to vindicate not only their
own free exercise claims, but also those of their high-school-age
children.” 98 When a child is mature enough to have potentially
conflicting religious beliefs, not considering those beliefs would
be an invasion of the child’s rights. 99 Justice Douglas suggested
that litigation may often be the best method for a child to
express conflicting desires with a parent. 100 “It is the future of
93.
See id. (citing testimony that many young Amish voluntarily leave
the faith and need to be prepared for fields outside of traditional opportunities
of the Amish).
94.
See id. (recognizing the state’s legitimate interest in preparing
children for a variety of options of future interests regardless of current
lifestyle).
95.
See id. (suggesting the case may have turned out differently if the
parent’s claim of religious belief effected more than the final two years of
required education).
96.
See id. at 242 (Douglas, J. dissenting) (“Where the child is mature
enough to express potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the
child’s rights to permit such an imposition without canvassing his views.”).
97.
See id. at 241 (“The Court’s analysis assumes that the only interests
at stake in the case are those of the Amish parents on the one hand, and those
of the State on the other.”).
98.
Id.
99.
See id. (discussing disagreement with the majority that the only
interests at stake are those of the Amish parents and the state when the
children are all of a high school age).
100.
See id. at 242 (“As the child has no other effective forum, it is in this
litigation that his rights should be considered.”).
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the student, not the future of the parents, that is imperiled by
today’s decision.” 101 If a child’s education is halted, her entire
future life may be stunted. 102 The concurrence and dissent were
cautioning against the parent–state dichotomy of control over
children when children’s futures and desires should be
considered.
Yoder is considered the paradigmatic hybrid rights case. 103
The Christian Rights movement relies on the ruling in Yoder as
a coupling of religious rights and parental rights to further
religious protection arguments. 104 In Yoder, the Amish parents
were removing their children from schools; however, in many
modern claims of parental and religious rights, parents seek
exemptions from certain aspects of the curriculum while
maintaining the child’s presence in the school. 105 Multiple
circuits have rejected parental challenges to curriculum based
on religious beliefs, specifically regarding sex-related LGBTQ

101.

Id. at 245.
See id. at 245–46 (“If he is harnessed to the Amish way of life by those
in authority over him and if his education is truncated, his entire life may be
stunted and deformed.”).
103.
See Douglas Nejaime, Inclusion, Accommodation, and Recognition:
Accounting for Differences Based on Religion and Sexual Orientation, 32 HARV.
J. L. & GENDER 303, 355 (2009) (“The 1972 case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, which
Justice Scalia cited in Smith for the ‘hybrid’ rights concept, has come to signify
the paradigmatic ‘hybrid’ rights case.”) (citations omitted).
104.
See id. at 356 (discussing different viewpoints on the applicability of
Yoder).
105.
See id. (discussing inherent differences in asking to be disengaged
from society instead of demanding continued membership, but on the terms of
individual parents).
102.
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inclusive programming. 106 However, courts have applied the
hybrid rights concept in a confused manner. 107
The constitutionally based fundamental right of parents to
decide the upbringing and education of their children is well
established through case law. 108 Parental rights are often
coupled with free exercise of religion claims, which creates a
hybrid right exception as Scalia discussed. 109 However, even
when parental rights and religious rights are coupled, a claim
to assert the rights may still be limited. 110 The following two
sections consider when the State retains a parens patriae right
to limit parents authority and when children’s rights should be
considered paramount to those of the parent.
C. The State as Parens Patriae Retains an Interest in the
Protection of Children
1. The “Best Interest of the Child” Test and a State’s Power to
Retain Control
Prince v. Massachusetts 111 argues the right of the state to
control children goes beyond the right of the state to control
106.
See Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 534 (1st
Cir. 1995) (rejecting parental challenges to mandatory AIDS education for
students); see also Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 2003)
(rejecting a heightened scrutiny approach for administering curriculum for all
children); Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005)
(rejecting a parental challenge to information administered to students
regarding issues of sex).
107.
See Nejaime, supra note 103, at 357 (“Some Courts have refused to
apply the ‘hybrid rights concept . . . . Others have applied it with such a
rigorous standard that concept does no independent work.”).
108.
See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the constitutional
framing of the fundamental right to discretion in parenting choices).
109.
See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the coupling of parents’
rights and religious rights to form a hybrid rights claim).
110.
See discussion supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the concurrence and
dissent in Yoder, which begin to limit the breadth of parental and religious
rights when coupled).
111.
See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1994) (concluded
the government has broad authority as parens patriae to protect the interests
of children).
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adults. 112 In Prince, a nine-year-old child was found selling
magazines in violation of a child labor law. 113 The Court
recognized the State’s parens patriae authority as paramount to
a parent’s right to discretion in the upbringing of his or her
children. 114 The Court reasoned, “Parents may be free to become
martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in
identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children
before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion
when they can make that choice for themselves.” 115 Further,
“[t]he right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to
expose the community or the child to communicable disease or
the latter to ill health or death.” 116 Parents do not have
unlimited rights in child-rearing. 117 “The power of the parent,
even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to
limitation under Prince if it appears that parental decisions will
jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential
for significant social burdens.” 118
Parens patriae exists as a doctrine for the government to act
as a provider of protection for those who are unable to protect
themselves. 119 A state maintains constitutional control over
children if their physical or mental health is at risk. 120 Parens
patriae authority is broad and allows aspects of family life to be
112.
See id. at 168 (“The state’s authority over children’s activities is
broader than over like actions of adults.”).
113.
See id. at 159–60 (discussing Betty M. Simmons, a nine-year-old girl,
who was found to have violated Massachusetts’ child labor laws regarding
selling magazines in a public place).
114.
See id. at 166 (“And neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood
are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well
being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
115.
Id. at 170.
116.
Id. at 166–67 (citing People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 210–11 (1903)).
117.
See id. at 170 (discussing the power of the state to control the conduct
of children).
118.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233–34 (1972) (citations omitted).
119.
Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
120.
See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (“[A] state is not without
constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when
their physical or mental health is jeopardized.”).
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regulated. 121 Parens patriae authority is not appropriate simply
because the state is well intentioned and the parent makes a
decision involving some level of risk. 122
Parental rights and religious rights have limits; therefore,
the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control. 123
The concept of parens patriae justifies state intervention in
family matters to protect minors. 124 Natural parents do not have
a clearly established right to unlimited exercise of religious
belief as it impacts their children. 125 Other guardians, such as
foster parents, enjoy even fewer constitutional protections than
natural parents. 126 Parents must clearly show an established
right to exercise religious beliefs if those religious beliefs are the
basis for potentially harmful decisions about how a child will be
raised. 127
121.
See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (“[T]he
family is not beyond regulation.”).
122.
See Parham, 422 U.S. at 603 (“Simply because the decision of a parent
is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does not automatically
transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or
officer of the state.”).
123.
See Margaret Ryznar & Chai Park, The Proper Guardians of Foster
Children’s Educational Interests, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 147, 154 (2010)
(“Specifically, neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond
limitation . . . .”).
124.
See id. at 153 (“Importantly, while parents have a right to raise their
children free from state intervention, children have a countervailing right to
protection from abuse and neglect.”) (citations omitted).
125.
See Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1985) (“First,
even natural parents have no clearly established right to unlimited exercise of
religious beliefs on their children . . . .” (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944))).
126.
See id. (“Second, foster parents do not enjoy the same constitutional
protections that natural parents do.” (citing Kyees v. Cty. Dep’t of Pub.
Welfare, 600 F.2d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 1979); Drummond v. Fulton Cty. Dep’t of
Family & Children’s Serv., 563 F.2d 1200, 1206–07 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc),
cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); Sherrard v. Owens, 484 F. Supp. 728, 740–
41 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff’d, 644 F.2d 542 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 828 (1981); Brown v. Cty. of San Joaquin, 601 F. Supp. 653, 665
(E.D.Cal.1985))).
127.
See id. (“To survive summary judgment, the Backlunds must show
that they, as foster parents, had a clearly established right to exercise their
religious beliefs about punishment on a foster child.”).
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2. Blood Transfusions: An Example of Parents’ Rights vs.
Parens Patriae
Case law regarding blood transfusions provides an example
of parental and religious rights in direct contrast with parens
patriae. The Jehovah’s Witness belief system requires an
abstention from blood transfusions to respect God as the only
provider of life. 128 Jehovah’s Witnesses in State of Washington v.
King County Hospital Unit No. 1 129 was a class action lawsuit
by the Jehovah’s Witness church of the State of Washington to
enjoin blood transfusions to any children in the church as a
violation of the church’s constitutional rights. 130 The claims
before the court involved ten individual cases where children of
Jehovah’s Witnesses were eventually given blood transfusions
over the objection of the children’s parents. 131 The children were
removed by court order from the custody of their parents, who
refused blood transfusions on religious grounds. 132 The children
were declared wards of the state, which allowed the state to

128.
See Why Don’t Jehovah’s Witnesses Accept Blood Transfusions?,
JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES, http://www.jw.org/en/jehovahs-witnesses/faq/jehovahswitnesses-why-no-blood-transfusions/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2019) (discussing
Jehovah’s Witnesses belief religious biblically based belief to abstain from
using blood and common misconceptions surrounding said belief) [https://
perma.cc/2D5G-ZC8M].
129.
See Jehovah’s Witnesses in Wash. v. King Cty. Hosp. Unit No. 1, 278
F. Supp. 488, 504 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff’d per curiam, 390 U.S. 598 (1968)
(holding that the family is not beyond regulation even when claiming religious
liberty).
130.
See id. at 491 (stating the various Jehovah’s Witnesses groups and
individuals participating in the class action seeking a declaration of the
plaintiff’s right to refuse blood transfusions and to enjoin the defendants,
including all medical doctors in the state, Superior Court judges, and Juvenile
Court employees from administering blood transfusions).
131.
See id. at 502 (discussing dismissals of certain defendants and
plaintiffs, focusing in the issues of the case to ten children who were given
blood transfusions on state order).
132.
See id. at 500 (recognizing the procedure of the Juvenile Court Law
allowing superior court judges and juvenile court employees to obtain custody
over children for the purpose of blood transfusions).
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authorize blood transfusions under Juvenile Court Law. 133 The
Juvenile Court Law in Washington required a finding that the
child was “grossly and willfully neglected as to medical care
necessary for his well-being.” 134 Court orders were obtained
despite express objection of the parents and attempts by the
parents to provide a written release discharging any and all
liability due to the parents’ refusal to accept a blood
transfusion. 135
The Jehovah’s Witnesses alleged the defendant’s actions
violated the parents’ First Amendment rights to free exercise of
religion and freedom of association. 136 Additionally, the
Jehovah’s Witnesses alleged that the state’s actions violated the
implied right of family privacy provided via the Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 137 The Jehovah’s Witnesses stated no
basis for parens patriae existed because parental discretion was
exercised in good faith in disagreement with medical
professionals about the desired treatment. 138 The Jehovah’s
Witnesses argued the actions by the judiciary and medical
professionals suggested that religion and family privacy were
not protected for members of the Jehovah’s Witness faith. 139 The
133.
See id. (discussing how the court order operates by making a child the
ward of the court for the individual purpose of authorizing a blood transfusion
if the doctor deems the transfusion medically necessary).
134.
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.010(12) (repealed 1978); id. § 13.04.095
(repealed 1978).
135.
See Jehovah’s Witnesses in Wash. v. King Cty. Hosp. Unit No. 1, 278
F. Supp. 488, 500 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (stating the parent’s attempts to provide
alternatives to exculpate the medical staff from liability resulting from express
opposition to blood transfusions).
136.
See id. (stating the plaintiff’s claim for a violation of the First
Amendment based on the inability for the Jehovah’s Witnesses to freely
associate together without prejudice from similar issues and to freely practice
the religious practice of abstaining from blood transfusions).
137.
See id. at 501 (stating the plaintiff’s claim for a violation of the Ninth
and Fourteenth Amendment based on the inability to utilize parental
discretion in decision regarding a child’s upbringing).
138.
See id. (recognizing the Jehovah’s Witnesses claim that parens
patriae is inapplicable to the current case because parental discretion in good
faith allows for disagreement in the best method to raise the child).
139.
See id. (recognizing the Jehovah’s Witnesses believe their lives and
religion were intruded upon by the government’s actions).
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Jehovah’s Witnesses believed a spiritual duty existed for a
father to ensure no family member received a blood
transfusion. 140 Accordingly, even though predominant medical
opinion suggested that blood transfusions were both safe and
necessary, the Jehovah’s Witnesses sought alternative means of
treatment. 141
The district court initially deciding the case in Washington
relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Prince. 142 The court
reasoned that parents are not free to make martyrs of their
children. 143 The court concluded that neither religious nor
parental rights are limitless and the state may act in the best
interest of a child through parens patriae when necessary. 144
The court reiterated that “[t]he right to practice religion freely
does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.” 145 The
juvenile court decision was upheld as constitutional. 146 Other
courts have followed the same logic for issues regarding
Jehovah’s Witnesses and blood transfusion cases. 147 King
140.
See id. (discussing the Jehovah’s Witness spiritual belief requiring a
father to intervene to stop any blood transfusions that would be administered
to a member of his family).
141.
See id. at 502 (discussing the existence of other alternative
treatments and of the alternatives available blood transfusions are often
considered necessary and among the safest options).
142.
See id. at 504 (recognizing Prince v. Massachusetts has a
substantially similar argument and will be considered controlling) (citations
omitted).
143.
See id. (discussing the parental right to martyr oneself, but the
limitation to make a child a martyr before reaching a legal age of discretion to
make their own choice).
144.
See id. (stating that neither constitutional right, parental privacy or
freedom of religion, provide limitless discretion to individuals where the State
may not exert controlling authority).
145.
See id. (comparing the relevant example of vaccination where State
authority trumped the parental and religious protections) (citing People v.
Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 210–11 (1903)).
146.
See id. at 505 (determining the state does have parens patriae
authority to direct children).
147.
See, e.g., People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769, 774 (1952)
(arguing the case at hand provides a more compelling scenario for state
intervention).
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County Hospital provides that limitations on freedom of religion
and the fundamental right to parental control may be necessary
to protect minors through parens patriae. 148
D. Glimmers of Children’s Rights and the Elimination of the
Parent–State Dichotomy of Control
1. Danforth and Bellotti Provide a Road Map for Children’s
Rights and Autonomy of Choice Through Mature Minor
Exemptions
Since the 1960s, an expansion of children’s rights has
occurred. 149 Minors— those under the age of majority—have
been given various constitutional rights through Supreme Court
decisions. 150 In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 151 physicians brought a suit challenging an abortion
law, which required a woman under the age of eighteen to
receive consent from a parent before the procedure could be
performed. 152 The Court concluded that a female under the age

The recent Prince decision reinforces that conclusion. The court
there held that a state, acting to safeguard the general interest in
the well-being of its youth, could prohibit a Jehovah’s Witness child
from distributing religious pamphlets on the street even though the
child was accompanied by her adult guardian. Obviously, the facts
before us present a far stronger case for State intervention.
Id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
148.
See Jehovah’s Witnesses in Wash. v. King Cty. Hosp. Unit No. 1, 278
F. Supp. 488, 504 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (stating that neither constitutional
rights, parental privacy, nor freedom of religion, provide limitless discretion
to individuals where the State may not exert controlling authority).
149.
See THOMAS A. JACOBS, 1 CHILDREN & THE LAW: RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS § 1:3 (2018) (providing an overview of late twentieth century
developments in children’s rights).
150.
See id. § 1:4 (discussing five Supreme Court cases that vastly
expanded the rights of minors including juvenile justice rights and freedom of
speech rights).
151.
See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
75 (1976) (holding a state could not lawfully authorize an absolute parental
veto over the decision of a minor to terminate her pregnancy).
152.
See id. at 72 (discussing Section 3(4) of House Committee Substitute
for House Bill No. 1211 which required unmarried women under the age of
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of majority should be given the same right of self-determination
of body given to an adult female, if the female under the age of
majority was sufficiently mature to understand and make an
intelligent decision. 153 The Court recognized an absolute bar on
abortions, without parental consent, was unconstitutional. 154
The Court further stated rights provided by the Constitution
were not magically attained when a minor reaches the age of
majority because minors, similar to adults, are protected under
the Constitution. 155 Danforth recognized this mature-minor
doctrine—even if it did not name the doctrine as such—which
allowed minors to make decisions about their healthcare if the
minor could articulate mature reasoning for the decision. 156 A
significant state interest, regarding child protection, could be
found to give the State authority to condition a minor’s abortion
on the consent of a parent, but none were provided. 157 The Court
carefully emphasized the invalidity of the statute was due to the
blanket provision and did not suggest every minor may give

eighteen to obtain written consent by either a parent or a person in loco
parentis).
153.
See id. at 75 (suggesting a consent provision for a person other than
the minor female to sign and her physician will violate Roe) (citing Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)).
154.
See id. at 74 (“[T]he State does not have constitutional authority to
give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision
of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient’s pregnancy,
regardless of the reason for withholding consent.”).
155.
See id. (“Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as
well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional
rights.”) (citations omitted).
156. See Mature-Minor Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
(“A rule holding that an adolescent, though not having reached the age of
majority, may make decisions about his or her health and welfare if the
adolescent demonstrates an ability to articulate reasoned preferences on those
matters.”).
157.
See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
75 (1976) (determining that providing absolute parental authority to veto the
decision to have an abortion will not, with certainty, protect the state interest
in safeguarding the family unit).
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consent, without parental supervision, for termination of the
pregnancy. 158
Children’s rights have further expanded by allowing minors
to consent to treatment of sexually transmitted diseases and
mental health conditions without parental consent via mature
minor protections. 159 States have varying limitations on minors
consenting to medical services. 160 For example, all fifty states
allow minors to obtain medical treatment for sexually
transmitted diseases without parental consent and twenty-six
states allow contraceptive services without parental consent,
but only two states allow abortion without any form of parental
consent or notice required. 161 Various states have statutorily
created an exemption for mature minors regarding medical
decisions if the minor can fully comprehend the consequences of
the medical decision and prove maturity. 162 However, the
numerous exceptions to the age of majority both between states

158.
See id. (distinguishing the nature of the absolute veto power of any
parent for their child’s abortion decision is unconstitutional, not that any child
can provide consent for termination of their pregnancy).
159.
See Josh Burk, Note, Mature Minors, Medical Choice, and the
Constitutional Right to Martyrdom, 102 VA. L. REV. 1355, 1366 (2016) (“In the
wake of Griswold v. Connecticut, states began to write legislation that allowed
minors to consent to the treatment of sexually-transmitted diseases without
parental consent. Some states, like Illinois, predated Griswold in granting
medial consent rights to pregnant minors.”) (citations omitted).
160.
See An Overview of Consent to Reproductive Health Services by Young
People, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore
/overview-minors-consent-law (last updated Apr. 1, 2020) (last visited Apr. 4,
2019) (providing a fifty state survey of medical services available to minors
without parental consent) [https://perma.cc/6USE-TFWD].
161.
See id. (discussing the number of states that offer specific types of
medical services to minors without parental consent).
162.
See Burk, supra note 159, at 1356 (stating the foundational
requirements for a mature minor exemption).
Some states have created a mature minor exemption for medical
consent purposes, which allows a minor the opportunity to make
the ultimate decision in her medical treatment. If the minor fully
comprehends the consequences of her decision and makes her
choice free of coercion or peer pressure, she is given the authority
to choose or refuse treatment.
Id.

654

26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 625 (2020)

and within states, suggests a categorical age of majority is
inadequate to meet current social needs. 163
In Bellotti v. Baird, 164 the Supreme Court found parental
consent laws do not obstruct the rights of the minor if judicial
consent is available to circumvent the parents’. 165 To obtain a
judicial bypass of parental consent, the maturity test of
Danforth is applied. 166 Alternatively, a court may employ a test
to show judicial bypass of parental consent is in the minor’s best
interest. 167 Judicial bypasses have been substantially criticized
because no distinct test of maturity exists. 168 Without a legal
test, the extremely subjective idea of maturity is left completely
to judicial discretion. 169 Various criteria have been used to
evaluate a minor’s maturity including age, academic
performance, intellectual capacity, future plans, and ability to
handle finances. 170 A general consensus exists that a minor is
mature to make a decision in a medical context if the minor can
163.
See id. at 1385 (arguing the many exceptions and contours of mature
minor exemptions suggests the age of majority has become inadequate for
determining all rights of children).
164.
See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (concluding every minor
must have the opportunity to go directly to a court without first notifying
parents when seeking an abortion).
165.
See id. (stating parental consent and notification laws are valid as
long as a meaningful judicial bypass process exists for minors).
166.
See id. at 643–44 (applying the same procedural factors as Danforth
entitling a pregnant minor to make a showing of maturity).
167.
See id. (applying the alternative test of Danforth for the minor to
show an abortion is in her best interest even in the absence of a showing of
maturity).
168.
See Anna C. Bonny, Parental Consent and Notification Laws in the
Abortion Context: Rejecting the “Maturity” Standard in Judicial Bypass
Proceedings, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 311, 313 (2007) (“The ‘maturity’
requirement of judicial bypass procedures should be dismissed entirely; its
application is biased and unworkable. Measuring maturity is a subjective
inquiry evidenced by the fact that even developmental psychologist disagree
on which factors correctly measure a minor’s maturity.”).
169.
See id. at 322 (“[J]udges have been forced to develop their own set of
criteria for evaluating maturity since the Supreme Court has never provided
a specific standard.”).
170.
See id. (acknowledging various criteria that has been used to evaluate
a maturity standard such as academic performance and personal finances).
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fully discuss the medical procedure, including the risks, and is
choosing the procedure free of various external pressures. 171
2. Emancipation from Parents Through Statutes and Common
Law
In addition to a mature minor test to obtain a judicial
bypass, many states have emancipation laws. 172 Emancipation
is the act of a parent surrendering all rights, obligations, and
duties related to the care of a child. 173 Emancipation ends both
the parent’s right to control the child’s upbringing and the
child’s right to parental support. 174 Although LGBTQ children
may wish to become free from non-affirming parental control,
the desire to be free from parental support, especially financial
support, does not necessarily follow.
The doctrine of emancipation emerged at the turn of the
twentieth century when many children began working in
factories. 175 Emancipation began as a common law doctrine and
remains a common law doctrine in eighteen states. 176 From the
1960s until now, thirty-two states have enacted emancipation
statutes that vary widely in requirements. 177 The statutes may
offer a broad “best interest of the minor” test or provide specific

171.
See Burk, supra note 159, at 1356 (stating the foundational
requirements for a mature minor exemption).
172.
See Lauren C. Barnett, Having Their Cake and Eating It Too?
Post-Emancipation Child Support as A Valid Judicial Option, 80 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1799, 1805 (2013) (discussing the existence of emancipation statutes in a
majority of states even though the substantive requirements vary widely).
173.
Emancipation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
174.
See Barnett, supra note 172, at 1800 (discussing the traditional
notion of divergence for emancipation and child support, if emancipation is
granted child support is denied).
175.
See Marks, supra note 23, at 81 (highlighting the emergence of
emancipation of children as a byproduct of children leaving home to work in
factories).
176.
See Barnett, supra note 172, at 1803 (stating that eighteen states still
rely on common law interpretation of emancipation).
177.
See id. (discussing the explosion of emancipation statutes in the
1960s, which then continued through 2009 when the most recent
emancipation statute was enacted).
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criteria to implement a “best interest of the minor” test. 178
Regardless of specific provisions, all statutes allow
emancipation only if it will be in the minor’s best interest. 179
Historically, the family law concepts of emancipation and
child support were divergent. 180 A finding of emancipation
would relinquish any claim a child had for parental support. 181
Often emancipation has been based upon a child’s financial
independence, releasing parents of financially independent
children from financial responsibilities. 182 Recently courts have
begun granting partial emancipation, allowing children to
assert rights normally provided upon complete emancipation,
but continuing to enforce parental obligations. 183
Partial emancipation provides that a child is free for only a
specific purpose or from part of the parent’s control. 184 Diamond
v. Diamond 185 was the first case in which partial emancipation
through an emancipation statute was recognized. 186 Jhette
Diamond left her mother’s home at age thirteen due to domestic

178.
See id. (discussing emancipation as a confused doctrine because the
codification of emancipation has led to great divergence in statutory
requirements).
179.
See id. at 1818 (stating that allow state emancipation statutes vary
widely they almost always demand that emancipation is within the minor’s
best interest).
180.
See id. at 1800 (discussing emancipation as severing a parent child
relationship and child support creating a bond in the parent child
relationship).
181.
See id. at 1802 (stating that emancipation typically severs the
relationship between parent and child which ends all rights and obligations of
the parents).
182.
See id. at 1810 (acknowledging many states, regardless of whether an
emancipation statute is codified, provide emancipation as an element that will
end child support requirements).
183.
See id. (recognizing common law allowed for partial emancipation
that enabled children to retain an enforcement right of parental obligations).
184.
Emancipation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
185.
See Diamond v. Diamond, 283 P.3d 260, 272 (N.M. 2012) (concluding
that Diamond was entitled to statutory partial emancipation while continuing
to receive financial support from her parent).
186.
See Barnett, supra note 172, at 1840 (stating Diamond was the first
instance of a court statutorily recognizing partial emancipation).
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violence and substance abuse. 187 Diamond was living with a
foster family and worked for multiple years at a local
restaurant. 188 Diamond requested the emancipation order
preserve her mother’s obligation of financial support. 189 The
District Court of New Mexico ordered Diamond emancipated but
allowed her to retain the right to support from her mother,
which the Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed. 190
Emancipation is automatically triggered when a child
reaches the age of majority. 191 Some courts have disregarded the
presumption of automatic emancipation by ordering child
support to continue through undergraduate education. 192 The
concept is contentious, with some states finding statutes
requiring child support beyond the age of majority
unconstitutional. 193 Mandatory parental support through
college and past the age of majority reinforces both the strength
of partial emancipation and the failure of age of majority
laws. 194

187.
See Diamond, 283 P.3d at 261 (providing the rational for why
Diamond had to leave home to improve her living situation).
188.
See id. (stating Diamond had lived with multiple families since age
thirteen yet maintained a job as server at a local restaurant and high grade
point average in high school).
189.
See id. (discussing Diamond’s situation was a classic case for
emancipation as Diamond had began managing her own finances and had no
intention of returning to her mother’s home, but she requested to retain the
ability to seek financial support from her mother).
190.
See id. (“[D]eclaring Daughter ‘an emancipated minor in all respects,
except that she shall retain the right to support from [Mother] . . . . ’”).
191.
See Barnett, supra note 172, at 1800 (stating emancipation occurs
automatically when a child reaches the age of majority, gets married, or joins
the military).
192.
See id. at 1827 (discussing how state courts have ignored the age of
majority giving automatic emancipation by requiring divorced parents to
continue to pay child support for secondary education expenses).
193.
See, e.g., Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 270 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)
(concluding a Pennsylvania statute requiring parental support beyond the age
of majority for post-secondary education was unconstitutional).
194.
See Barnett, supra note 172, at 1827 (arguing a strict interpretation
of emancipation would undermine the ability of a court to require child support
beyond the age of majority).
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The parent–state dichotomy of control has often left
children without legal rights. 195 The rights of all children are
important, but the rights of LGBTQ children are particularly
important because LGBTQ children face additional mental,
emotional, and physical health concerns. 196 The parental rights
recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment and the religious
freedom exemptions recognized under the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment can diminish the ability to protect
children from harmful parental decisions. 197 The state acting as
parens patriae, mature minor exemptions, and emancipation
offer the few, imperfect pathways for LGBTQ children to escape
destructive parental authority.
III. Harm to LGBTQ Children and How the Child Welfare
System Allows for Further Harm
A. Harm to LGBTQ Children Generally
LGBTQ youth endure discrimination, harassment, and
abuse due to their actual or perceived identities. 198 Some youth
run away and enter foster care seeking refuge from their
non-affirming biological parents. 199 However, the foster care
system does not always provide a safe environment, and some
LGBTQ youth may feel safer on the streets. 200 Five to ten

195.
See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the historical context for
parental and state control of children).
196.
See discussion infra Part III.A (discussing the various increase
suicide risks for LGBTQ individuals).
197.
See discussion supra Part II.B (highlighting examples of harmful
parental decisions).
198.
See Larisa Maxwell, Fostering Care For All: Towards Meaningful
Legislation to Protect LGBTQ Youth in Foster Care, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 209,
211 (2013) (stating LGBTQ face a myriad of negative actions within the foster
care system due to sexual preference and gender identity).
199.
See id. (noting LGBTQ youth leave biological families and enter into
the state foster system to find safer homes).
200.
See id. (noting LGBTQ youth end up homeless after escaping unsafe
home environments created by both biological parents and foster parents).
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percent of youth in foster care identify as LGBTQ. 201 About
400,000 children are in foster care each year, 202 which suggests
20,000–40,000 are LGBTQ youth who may face discrimination,
harassment, and abuse.
Suicide is the second highest cause of death in the United
States for people ages ten to twenty-four. 203 Children in the
LGBTQ community face higher rates of suicide and suicidal
ideation. 204 LGBTQ children experience serious suicidal
ideation at nearly three times the rate of heterosexual youths. 205
LGBTQ children attempt suicide at nearly five times the rate of
heterosexual youths. 206 LGBTQ children living with neutral
families (neither particularly affirming or non-affirming)
attempt suicide at two times the rate of LGBTQ youth in highly
affirming families. 207
201.
See COLLEEN SULLIVAN ET AL., YOUTH IN THE MARGINS: A REPORT ON
THE UNMET NEEDS OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER
ADOLESCENTS IN FOSTER CARE 11 (2001) (stating the total percentage of likely

LGBTQ youth in the foster care system).
202.
See Foster Care, CHILD TRENDS (May 24, 2018), https://
www.childtrends.org/indicators/foster-care (last visited Feb. 4, 2020)
(providing a numerical figure for the number of LGBTQ youth in foster care
across the United States that are possibly receiving inadequate services)
[https://perma.cc/76W5-EL54].
203.
See MELONIE HERON, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
DEATHS: LEADING CAUSES FOR 2016 10 (2018) (providing the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention annual report on statistical analysis of
leading causes of death for all age groups).
204.
See Facts About Suicide, THE TREVOR PROJECT, https://
www.thetrevorproject.org/resources/preventing-suicide/facts-about-suicide
/#sm.000195zxu4jkcfrrwjr28clp2ptb2 (last visited Feb. 6, 2020) (providing
compilation of statistics regarding suicide and LGBTQ suicide) [https://
perma.cc/TH5E-RL9M].
205.
See LAURA KANN ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
SEXUAL IDENTITY, SEX OF SEXUAL CONTACTS, AND HEALTH-RELATED BEHAVIORS
AMONG STUDENTS IN GRADES 9–12—UNITED STATES AND SELECTED SITES, 2015
19 (2016) (comparing the rates of serious contemplation of suicide by gay,
lesbian, or bisexual students to heterosexual students).
206.
See id. at 20 (comparing the rates of attempted suicide of gay, lesbian,
or bisexual students to heterosexual students).
207.
See Caitlin Ryan et al., Family Acceptance in Adolescence and the
Health of LGBT Young Adults, 23 J. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC
NURSING 4, 208 (2010) (“[T]he prevalence of suicide attempts among

660

26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 625 (2020)

The prevalence of attempted suicide is highest for the
transgender community. 208 A medical consensus exists that
attempting to stop an individual from being transgender is both
ineffective and harmful. 209 Forty percent of transgender adults
have attempted suicide. 210 The transgender community’s
suicide rate is nine times higher than the overall rate of suicide
within the United States. 211 Ninety percent of transgender
individuals who attempt suicide do so before the age of
twenty-five, which highlights the prevalence of attempted
suicide for transgender children. 212 Thirty percent of
transgender individuals have experienced homelessness, and
for those who have attempted to access a homeless shelter,
seventy percent reported abuse. 213 The rates for transgender
individuals experiencing homelessness, experiencing serious
psychological distress, and attempting suicide all increase by

participants who reported high levels of family acceptance was nearly half
(30.9% versus 56.8%) the rate of those who reported family acceptance.”).
208.
See Facts About Suicide, supra note 204 (comparing various LGBTQ
community statistics on attempted suicide).
209.
See SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., THE
REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY 108 (2016), https://
www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/USTS-Full-Report-FINAL.PDF
(acknowledging the general agreement among medical professionals that
attempts to convert transgender individuals to the sex assigned at birth is
psychologically harmful for transgender individuals) [https://perma.cc/WX635AFD].
210.
Id. at 114.
211.
See id. (highlighting the stark rate increase in attempted suicide for
the transgender community over the 4.6 percent attempted suicide rate of the
total United States population).
212.
See id. at 115 (providing that one-third of participants reported their
first suicide attempt was before the age of thirteen, thirty-nine percent
reported their first suicide attempt was between the age of fourteen and
seventeen, and twenty percent reported their first suicide attempt was
between eighteen and twenty-four).
213.
See id. at 176 (highlighting both the rate which transgender
individuals experience homelessness and the high rate of harassment within
homeless shelters leaving many homeless transgender individuals without
options).
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almost twenty percent when delineated between affirming
families and non-affirming families. 214
Various medical and psychiatric organizations have
acknowledged the importance of providing affirming care to
LGBTQ individuals. 215 The American Medical Association
(hereinafter “AMA”) supports health insurance coverage of
treatment for gender dysphoria. 216 The AMA directly opposes
reparative or conversion therapy based upon an assumption
that homosexuality is a mental disorder. 217 The American
Psychiatric Association (hereinafter “APA”) has recognized the
benefits of gender-affirming treatment and discourages barriers
to gender transition treatment. 218 Additionally, the APA
214.
See id. at 8 (analyzing that homelessness, psychological distress, and
attempted suicide rates are all higher within non-affirming families compared
with families who affirm transgender status).
215.
See LAMBDA LEGAL, PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION STATEMENTS
SUPPORTING
TRANSGENDER
PEOPLE
IN
HEALTH
CARE,
https://
www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/publications/downloads/resource
_trans-professional-statements_09-18-2018.pdf (last updated Sept. 17, 2018)
(last visited Mar. 6, 2020) (providing statements by professional organizations
in the medical and psychiatric fields in support of transgender services)
[https://perma.cc/27H5-4N3C]; see also Policy and Position Statements on
Conversion Therapy, HUMAN RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources
/policy-and-position-statements-on-conversion-therapy (last visited Mar. 6,
2020) (providing statements by professional organizations in the medical and
psychiatric fields in opposition to conversion therapy treatments) [https://
perma.cc/JZ9N-6KKT].
216.
See Resolution H-185.950: Removing Financial Barriers to Care for
Transgender Patients, AM. MED. ASS’N (2016), https://policysearch.amaassn.org/policyfinder/detail/H-185.950?uri=%2FAMADoc%2FHOD.xml-01128.xml (last visited Mar. 6, 2020) (stating support for public and private
health insurance coverage of gender dysphoria) [https://perma.cc/DS5WS8YH].
217.
See Resolution H-160.991: Health Care Needs of Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Transgender and Queer Populations, AM. MED. ASS’N (2018), https://
policysearch.ama-assn.org/policyfinder/detail/H160.991?uri=%2FAMADoc%2FHOD.xml-0-805.xml (last visited Mar. 6, 2020)
(recognizing the need for the LGBTQ community to receive adequate
healthcare by committing to medical educational programs in support of the
LGBTQ community) [https://perma.cc/74GS-GAU5].
218.
See Position Statement on Access to Care for Transgender and Gender
Diverse Individuals, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (July 2018), https://
www.psychiatry.org/home/policy-finder (last visited Mar. 6, 2020) (stating the
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supports laws protecting gender diversity. 219 The APA has
stated psychotherapeutic techniques to convert homosexuals is
based on scientifically questionable theories with no
substantiated research. 220 Other organizations such as the
American Psychological Association, the American Academy of
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and the American Academy of
Pediatrics have made similar statements opposing laws
discriminating against transgender individuals and opposing
the use of conversion therapy due to the mental affect that
patients would likely experience. 221
B. Child Welfare Legislation Creates Religious Exemptions that
Allow Harm to LGBTQ Children
Parental rights, religious rights, and rights of minors are
competing rights. The tensions between them become more
problematic when the state, through the child welfare system,
is acting as parent. Currently no branch of the federal
government provides clear guidance on the breadth of religious
exemptions for child welfare providers. 222
APA official action in recognition of appropriate medical treatment for gender
diverse individuals) [https://perma.cc/5XB7-UDYQ].
219.
See Position Statement on Discrimination Against Transgender and
Gender Diverse Individuals, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (July 2018), https://
www.psychiatry.org/home/policy-finder (last visited Mar. 6, 2020) (stating the
APA official action in opposition to all gender discrimination as transgender
individuals have no impairment in any abilities based on their gender
identity) [https://perma.cc/CC5B-CW26].
220.
See Position Statement on Conversion Therapy and LGBTQ Patients,
AM.
PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N
(Dec.
2018),
https://www.psychiatry.org
/File%20Library/About-APA/Organization-Documents-Policies/Policies
/Position-Conversion-Therapy.pdf) (last visited Mar. 6, 2020) (stating the APA
official action in opposition to any practice attempting to change an
individual’s sexual orientation as attempts to change sexual orientation are
harmful) [https://perma.cc/2YCZ-JVXV].
221.
See sources cited supra note 215 (citing various medical and
psychiatric organizations that have policy statements about LGBTQ
terminology).
222.
See Oakley, supra note 6, at 9 (noting Congress has been unable to
pass overarching legislation either allowing or prohibiting discrimination
under religious exemptions and the Supreme Court has not conclusively
determined the constitutionality of state action with religious exemptions).
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Congressional legislation has been introduced both to
expand the availability of religious exemptions for child welfare
providers and to limit religious exemptions in order to protect
LGBTQ individuals from discrimination. 223 The Child Welfare
Provider Inclusion Act 224 and the First Amendment Defense
although
unsuccessful,
would
have
allowed
Act, 225
discrimination against LGBTQ individuals through religious
exemptions. 226
Yet to succeed in Congress, the Every Child Deserves a
Family Act 227 and Equality Act 228 would prohibit welfare service
providers from discriminating against children or parents in
various family services. 229 The Every Child Deserves a Family
Act would disallow both discrimination against prospective
foster parents and prospective foster children based on sexual

223.
See id. at 10 (noting various members of Congress have attempted to
expand religious exemptions infringing upon LGBTQ rights and others have
attempted to expand equal protection for LGBTQ rights to supersede religious
exemption claims).
224.
See Child Welfare Provider Inclusion Act, H.R. 1881, S. 811, 115th
Cong. § 3(a) (2017) (stating adverse action may not be taken against child
welfare service providers who act in accordance with sincerely held religious
beliefs).
225.
See First Amendment Defense Act, S. 2525, 115th Cong. § 3(a) (2017)
(stating the federal government may not take action against a person acting
in accordance with sincerely held religious belief or moral conviction).
226.
See Oakley, supra note 6, at 10 (noting the negative ramifications of
the Child Welfare Provider Inclusion Act and the First Amendment Defense
Act).
227.
See Every Child Deserves a Family Act, H.R. 2640, S. 1303, 115th
Cong. § 3(a)(A)(1) (2017) (prohibiting any child welfare service entity receiving
federal assistance from denying services on the basis of sexual orientation or
gender identity).
228.
See Equality Act, H.R. 2282, S. 1006, 115th Cong. (2017) (extending
recognized class protections to sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity).
229.
See Oakley, supra note 6, at 10 (noting the protections provided in the
Every Child Deserves a Family Act and the Equality Act).
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orientation, gender identity, and marital status. 230 The bill has
been proposed and failed multiple times since 2009. 231
A handful of states have created religious exemption laws
of varying powers, because both Congress and the Supreme
Court have been silent regarding the constitutionality of
religious exemptions allowing discrimination against LGBTQ
individuals. 232 At the close of 2017, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Texas, Alabama, Mississippi, Michigan, and Virginia
had enacted laws allowing child welfare providers to
discriminate under religious exemptions in the provision of
child welfare services. 233 Originally, these bills focused on
refusing to place a child with same-sex parents, with whom the
agency had a religious or moral objection. 234 Broader
discriminatory bills have surfaced however, allowing
discrimination in more services and against children
themselves. Tennessee recently became the latest state to allow
child welfare agencies to operate under religious exemptions,
even if this jeopardizes the best interests of the child. 235 As of
January 2020, the Human Rights Watch recognizes nine
states—Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia—that
230.
See Maxwell, supra note 198, at 221 (stating the specific
discriminatory actions prohibited by the Every Child Deserves a Family Act).
231.
See id. at 221 (citing the various representatives who introduced the
act across a span of years, all failing to even have the bill make it out of
committee).
232.
See Oakley, supra note 6, at 5–8 (discussing the various versions of
state bills that have passed allowing child welfare service providers to deny
services based on sincerely held religious beliefs).
233.
See id. at 5 (“At the close of 2017, seven states have versions of license
to discriminate in child welfare laws on the books—three of which were passed
in 2017 and five of which were passed in the last three years.”).
234.
See id. at 5 (stating the broadest swath of discriminatory child welfare
bills target same-sex parents by disallowing adoption services based on
religious exemptions).
235.
See Ryan Thoreson, New Tennessee Law Deepens Discrimination
Against LGBT People, HUMAN RTS. WATCH (Jan. 28, 2020, 1:42 PM), https://
www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/28/new-tennessee-law-deepens-discriminationagainst-lgbt-people (last visited Mar. 7, 2020) (discussing the Tennessee
religious freedom exemption, which was signed by the governor on January
24th) [https://perma.cc/6V9J-7LGM].
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allow for taxpayer-funded child welfare agencies to use religious
exemptions to discriminate against LGBTQ individuals. 236
Specifically, Texas and Mississippi have very expansive
statutes. 237 The Protection of Rights of Conscience for Child
Welfare Service Providers Act in Texas allows agencies to refuse
children services to which the agency objects based on religious
beliefs. 238 The provisions allow a child welfare agency in Texas
to deny children in their care mental health services,
contraceptives, and hormone therapy. 239 Mississippi’s
Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government
Discrimination Act 240 similarly allows for the denial of medical
treatment (such as hormone therapy) if the agency has a
religious objection. 241 Most of the mentioned states provide a
236.
See id. (noting the various states who have child welfare agency
religious exemption laws currently enacted).
237.
See Oakley, supra note 6, at 5 (noting Mississippi, Texas, and South
Dakota have the broadest religious exemption protections).
238.
See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.005 (West 2019) (stating child
welfare service providers will be protected if actions are taken based on
sincerely held religious beliefs).
239.
See Oakley, supra note 6, at 8 (stating the broad negative implications
Texas’ expansive statute will have). The author stated:
Among other things, that means a state has its hands tied—it
cannot cancel the contract or refuse to give the agency a contract in
the future—if the agency refuses to provide children in their care
with necessary medical services (like hormone therapy,
contraceptives, or affirming mental health care) or even if the
agency forces children in their care, justified by the agency’s
religious belief, to dangerous and abusive practices such as
so-called “conversion therapy.”
Id.
240.
See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-62-5 (2016) (stating the state government
will not take action against a religious organization acting wholly or partially
on the basis of the organizations beliefs).
241.
See id. (describing the broad circumstances that child welfare
providers may seek religious exemptions). The statute reads:
(3) The state government shall not take any discriminatory action
against a religious organization that advertises, provides or
facilitates adoption or foster care, wholly or partially on the basis
that such organization has provided or declined to provide any
adoption or foster care service, or related service, based upon or in
a manner consistent with a sincerely held religious belief or moral
conviction described in Section 11-62-3. (4) The state government
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general religious exemption to the provision of services, but the
Mississippi statute allows agencies to deny LGBTQ individuals
related services by explicitly mentioning “surgeries related to
sex reassignment or gender identity transitioning[.]” 242
These states have enacted legislation that puts LGBTQ
children in non-affirming situations, which increases their risk
of committing suicide. 243 Further, these statutes conflict with
both the American Psychiatric Association and American
Medical Association’s positions on LGBTQ individuals. 244
Because of increased likelihood of harm for LGBTQ children
when they are in non-affirming situations, it is important to find
a pathway for LGBTQ children to escape destructive parental
authority, especially in the context of discriminatory child
welfare agencies.
IV. Remedies for LGBTQ Children to Seek Protections When
Parental Actions Are Harmful
The parent–state dichotomy of control coupled with the
harm LGBTQ children endure in non-affirming homes
highlights the need to locate legal remedies for LGBTQ children.
The state acting as parens patriae or enacting protective
legislation or children asserting substantive due process claims,
mature minor exemptions, or partial emancipation offer a few,

Id.

shall not take any discriminatory action against a person wholly or
partially on the basis that the person declines to participate in the
provision of treatments, counseling, or surgeries related to sex
reassignment or gender identity transitioning or declines to
participate in the provision of psychological, counseling, or fertility
services based upon a sincerely held religious belief or moral
conviction described in Section 11-62-3.

242.

Id.
See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the statistically higher
likelihood of suicide and suicide ideation in non-affirming homes for LGBTQ
children).
244.
See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing various medical and
psychiatric organization’s positions on conversion therapy and gender
nonconformity).
243.
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imperfect pathways for LGBTQ children to escape destructive
parental authority.
A. States Should Utilize Parens Patriae Authority or Enact
Legislation as a Protective Remedy for LGBTQ Children
The example of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and blood
transfusion is similar to discrimination of LGBTQ children
because each situation presents a conflict between parental
rights, religious rights, and the rights of minors. 245 In King
County Hospital, the parental refusal to accept a blood
transfusion on behalf of the child was invalid because parents
are not allowed to make martyrs of their children, regardless of
parental rights and religious freedom claims. 246 The right of the
child to bodily autonomy was determined to be superior to
claims of parental and religious rights. 247 When LGBTQ
children endure living with non-affirming families, they
experience harm. When parents make medical decisions directly
affecting the health of their LGBTQ children, those children
deserve protection. 248 When parents take direct medical actions,
the state as parens patriae should protect LGBTQ children’s
right to bodily autonomy.
The state is often hesitant to enforce parens patriae because
of its respect for the inner sanctum of the family. 249 States such
as Mississippi and Texas, where religious exemption statutes
245.
See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the confluence of
parental rights, religious rights, and children’s rights in Jehovah’s Witnesses
in State of Washington v. King County Hospital Unit No. 1).
246.
Jehovah’s Witnesses in State of Wash. v. King County Hosp. Unit No.
1, 278 F. Supp. 488, 504 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff’d per curiam, 390 U.S. 598
(1968) (discussing the parental right to martyr oneself, but the limitation to
make a child a martyr before reaching a legal age of discretion to make their
own choice) (citations omitted).
247.
See id. (stating that neither constitutional right, parental privacy or
freedom of religion, provide limitless discretion to individuals where the State
may not exert controlling authority).
248.
See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing increased suicide rates
due to LGBTQ children living with non-affirming families).
249.
See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the courts apprehension
in interfering in family life).
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already exist in the context of foster care provision, are unlikely
to exert parens patriae authority to protect LGBTQ children.
Similar to the situation in Yoder, parental rights often
become intertwined with claims of religious freedom. 250 The
religious decisions of parents can conflict with both the interests
of their children and the interests of the state. 251 For example,
Mississippi courts have noted the preemptory nature of state’s
parens patriae interest for medical treatment of minors. 252
Mississippi does not allow a parent to claim a religious
exemption in an effort to not vaccinate their child. 253 However,
the state legislature allows for foster parents with sincerely held
religious beliefs to deny medical services related to transitioning
status 254 and to exempt those foster parents from government
action. 255
States are considered the laboratories for experimentation,
particularly for the regulation of family law matters. 256 Take, as
an example, California. The Foster Care Nondiscrimination

250.
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233–34 (1972) (“[T]he power of
the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to
limitation under Prince if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize
the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social
burdens.”).
251.
See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1994) (“And neither
rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to
guard the general interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae
may restrict the parent’s control . . . .”).
252.
See Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 222 (1979) (adopting the notion
parens patriae authority requires the state to order medical treatment to save
the lives of a child via Prince in deciding that no religious exception can be
allowed for parents to not vaccinate their children) (citations omitted).
253.
See id. (“[A] person’s right to exhibit religious freedom ceases where
it overlaps and transgresses the rights of others.”).
254.
See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-62-5 (2016) (stating the state government
will not take action against a religious organization acting wholly or partially
on the basis of the organizations beliefs).
255.
See id. (noting government action is disallowed when child welfare
service providers are denying medical services and mental health treatment
on the basis of religious beliefs).
256.
See Maxwell, supra note 198, at 225 (recognizing family law matters
to be generally be a state concern and not a federal concern).
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Act 257 went into effect in California on January 1, 2004. 258 The
Foster Care Nondiscrimination Act was the first of its kind with
broad class designations for “actual or perceived” sexual
orientation and gender identity and protections against
discrimination and harassment. 259 Unfortunately, the Foster
Care Nondiscrimination Act lacks an enforcement mechanism,
leaving parties confused on how the statute will be applied. 260
States should consider the protected parties, prohibited
mistreatment,
specific
definitions,
clear
enforcement
mechanisms, and provisions for assistance while designing
protections for LGBTQ children. 261
All states should immediately begin attempting to enact
similar statutes. However, it is extremely unlikely all states will
begin to enact broad expansive protections for LGBTQ youth,
either in the foster system or more generally. Although state
authority is a plausible avenue for protecting LGBTQ children,
nationwide state action through local legislation or by state
intervention as parens patriae is unlikely, especially in states
that have adopted child welfare service religious exemptions.

257.
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16501.31 (West 2018) (providing broad
protections for various classes, but specifically for sexual orientation and
gender identity).
258.
See id. (recognizing both actual and perceived protected class,
including sex and gender). The statute reads:
[T]he rights of a foster child to have fair and equal access to all
available services, placement, care, treatment, and benefits, and to
not be subjected to discrimination or harassment on the basis of
actual or perceived race, ethnic group identification, ancestry,
national origin, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender
identity, mental or physical disability, or HIV status.
Id.
259.
See Maxwell, supra note 198, at 220 (addressing the merits of the
Foster Care Nondiscrimination Act).
260.
See id. (“Parties may also have difficulty determining the most
appropriate way to seek remedies.”).
261.
See id. at 225 (discussing the relevant concerns States should
consider implementing effective protections for LGBTQ youth in the foster
care system).
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B. LGBTQ Children in the Child Welfare System Harmed by
Parental Action Hold a Valid Substantive Due Process Claim
Under the Fourteenth Amendment
The Constitution’s Due Process Clauses, found in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, were originally understood to be
procedural and not substantive. 262 In Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 263
the Supreme Court reasoned that in order to be substantive in
nature, the Due Process Clauses require a deprivation of life,
liberty, or property. 264 To claim a substantive due process
violation, the preliminary requirements of jurisdiction,
justiciability, and harm by a governmental actor must be met. 265
The standards of jurisdiction and justiciability (standing,
mootness, ripeness) require individual analysis and thus will
not be considered in this Note. 266
1. LGBTQ Children in the Child Welfare System Are Harmed
by Parental Action via Governmental Action
A substantive due process claim requires that harm be
caused by government action. 267 Foster systems, whether public

262.
See Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis,
26 U.S.F. L. REV. 625, 625–26 (1992) (noting that substantive due process did
not conceptually exist prior to 1890).
263.
See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (concluding a
substantive due process violation can occur when there has been a deprivation
of life, liberty, or property).
264.
See id. (“[W]e think the statute is a violation of the fourteenth
amendment of the federal constitution, in that it deprives the defendants of
their liberty without due process of law.”).
265.
See Galloway, supra note 262, at 628 (reviewing the preliminary
procedure for evaluating substantive due process claims).
266.
Various factual scenarios will lead to different analysis under
considerations of jurisdiction and justiciability. These standards would likely
be met in the context of children within the foster system who are harmed by
their foster parents’ decisions.
267.
See Galloway, supra note 262, at 629 (“Deprivations of life, liberty, or
property inflicted by a person acting in a purely private capacity need not
comply with the due process clauses.”).

SEEKING REMEDIES FOR LGBTQ CHILDREN

671

or private in nature, act in concurrence with the government. 268
Public child welfare systems administered by states meet the
government action requirement, even though the actions
LGBTQ children would challenge are actions made by
individual foster parents. 269 Foster parents in the public child
welfare system are acting on behalf of the state to provide a
home and an upbringing for children who have become wards of
the state. The simple act of providing a non-affirming home can
be harmful, but more egregious behavior such as the denial of
medical treatment or an attempt to use conversion therapy
makes the harm direct and actionable. 270
Privatized child welfare systems have a more attenuated
connection to state action. The various exceptions to the state
action doctrine are the compulsion, nexus, entanglement, and
public function tests, which all generally analyze whether a
state requires, encourages, or is significantly involved in private
conduct. 271 The case history questioning whether private action
will be deemed state action is inconsistent. 272 Historically, the
268.
See Sacha M. Coupet, The Subtlety of State Action in Privatized Child
Welfare Services, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 85, 126 (2007) (arguing as the child welfare
system becomes more privatized the acts of private child welfare providers
should be considered governmental acts).
269.
See id. at 111 (noting state agencies are constitutional accountable
for any harms that occur to children in the custody of the state).
270.
See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the statistically higher
likelihood of suicide and suicide ideation in non-affirming homes for LGBTQ
children).
271.
See Coupet, supra note 268, at 107 (discussing the various tests used
to make exceptions to the state action doctrine). The test the article considers
were:
[T]he “compulsion” test, exploring the manner in which the state
has exercised any affirmative conduct compelling the conduct
complained of, (2) the ‘nexus’ test, examining the degree of state
involvement in private conduct, and (3) the ‘public function’ test,
which looks substantively to the nature of the function performed
to assess its public versus private identity.
Id.
272.
See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the cases which consider private
action as possibly a governmental action are not consistent and the courts
have used a variety of tests and standards).
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public function test has been most often applied to the child
welfare system. 273
Within the private child welfare system, the state action of
legally removing and formally placing children in the welfare
system must occur. 274 The power to greatly benefit or
detrimentally hurt children lies in the unique authority to break
apart the family as a fundamental societal unit. 275 Further, the
most common model for public–private welfare partnerships is
contracting out child welfare services to private providers that
will continue to be financed by the government. 276 Beginning in
the 1960s, amendments to the Social Security Act allowed
federal money to fund private, non-profit social service agencies
creating public–private child welfare partnerships. 277 More
recent amendments to the Social Security Act have enabled
continued maintenance payments to for-profit and nonprofit
private child welfare providers for services, which led some
states, such as Kansas and Florida, to completely privatize their
child welfare system. 278
The public function test has been construed broadly and
narrowly by the Supreme Court. 279 The more narrow
273.
See Coupet, supra note 268, at 108 (noting the public welfare system
gave way to public-private partnerships in the 1960s).
274.
See id. at 102 (“[T]he fact that children may only be legally removed
and formally placed in the child welfare system through a court order renders
this conduct arguably the least ambiguous form of state action.”).
275.
See id. (considering the monopoly of power the state retains to place
children, which leads to private welfare placement of children that may be
completely unaccountable).
276.
See id. at 95 (acknowledging the predominant method of
public-private partnerships within child welfare provision utilize a method of
State’s contracting out foster children to private welfare providers).
277.
See id. at 94 (noting the philosophical shift of the Reagan
administration toward private solutions to social problems which diminished
governmental presence in child welfare services and gave rise to the
public-private partnerships).
278.
See id. at 95 (acknowledging the continued move toward the
privatization of the child welfare system based on changes to the Social
Security Act).
279.
Compare Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 503 (1946) (suggesting if
an entity is the functional equivalent of a government entity then it is in fact
a government entity), with Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357
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construction of the public function test is more often used. 280 In
Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services, 281 the Court concluded that “when the State takes a
person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the
Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume
responsibility for his safety and general well-being.” 282 A
Deshaney footnote provided the framework for a state’s
affirmative duty to safeguard children in their custody against
harm. 283 Under the logic of Deshaney, the state must safeguard
LGBTQ children against potentially harmful situations.
However, it remains an open question if this fully extends to
privately contracted child welfare service providers. 284 Although
privatized child welfare systems may not be considered joint
government and private party action, 285 the government action
requirement can still be met if the conduct is a public
function. 286

(1974) (suggesting the required nexus is present only if the powers are the
exclusive prerogative of the State).
280.
See Coupet, supra note 268, at 110 (discussing the inconsistent
standard for the public function test, but acknowledging a narrow approach is
often used).
281.
See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
201–03 (1989) (noting the State’s exercise of removal power gives rise to an
affirmative duty to protect).
282.
Id. at 199–200.
283.
See id. at 201 n.9 (“Had the State by the affirmative exercise of its
power removed Joshua from free society and placed him in a foster home
operated by its agents, we might have a situation sufficiently analogous to
incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty to
protect.”); Coupet, supra note 268, at 111, (“[P]ost-DeShaney cases make clear
that constitutional accountability by state agencies may follow for harms
suffered by children in state custody . . . .”).
284.
See Coupet, supra note 268, at 111 (“[I]t remains unclear and
inconsistent as a matter of common law under what circumstances
constitutional accountability will extend to the private providers with whom
state agencies now increasingly contract for services.”).
285.
See id. at 88 (“Privatization is a rather amorphous and ill-defined
term, as there are a variety of ways in which public-private partnerships have
developed and expanded to deliver public services.”).
286.
See Galloway, supra note 262, at 630 (discussing options to fulfill the
government action requirement if the action is taken directly by or jointly with
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Unfortunately, LGBTQ children seeking protection from
biological parents will be unable to assert a substantive due
process claim. Even if these children maintain a deprivation of
life and liberty related to bodily autonomy, no governmental
action is present. If a child is not in the welfare system and thus
unable to assert a substantive due process claim, a state should
have the duty to assert its parens patriae authority to protect
LGBTQ children from harmful parental action, as discussed in
the prior section.
2. Requirements for a Substantive Due Process Claim and the
Infringement of Life, Liberty, and Property
After meeting the preliminary requirements, a substantive
due process claim must succeed on the merits. The Court has
developed a two-part test requiring first, that the government
action has affected a due-process interest, and second, that the
action was sufficiently adverse to constitute a deprivation. 287
The Supreme Court has interpreted the due process interests—
life, liberty, and property—broadly. 288 Both the interests in life
and liberty are implicated when LGBTQ children are living in
non-affirming homes, specifically when parents authorize
harmful action such as conversion therapy or the withdrawal of
hormone therapy. 289 Similarly, parental medical decisions that
increase the chance LGBTQ children will attempt suicide
should be considered an injury depriving LGBTQ children of due
process protections. 290
The final, most important step of the substantive due
process analysis is deciding whether the challenged
the government, such as conduct that is traditionally reserved for the
government as a public function).
287.
See id. (highlighting the conceptual framework for evaluating
substantive due process claims).
288.
See id. at 631 (“Given the inclusive definition of liberty and property,
the protected interest requirement does not play a major role in substantive
due process analysis.”).
289.
See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing various harms endured by
LGBTQ children who live in non-affirming homes).
290.
See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing suicide rates for LGBTQ
children and how parent actions may affect those rates).
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governmental action infringes a fundamental right, which
determines the level of scrutiny. 291 If a fundamental right has
been infringed, the statute under consideration will be subject
to strict scrutiny and thus presumed unconstitutional. 292 If a
fundamental right of bodily autonomy for children existed, any
infringement would have to be narrowly tailored to justify a
compelling government interest. 293
The Court has considered various frameworks when
defining a fundamental right, but two essential frameworks,
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” 294 and “deeply rooted
in this Nation’s history and tradition,” 295 have developed. 296
Fundamental rights may not be easily infringed upon by the
state and require a statute to have a compelling government
interest and to be narrowly tailored at advancing the interest. 297
Government deprivations not related to fundamental rights
are only subject to rational review. 298 Rational review analysis
291.
See Galloway, supra note 262, at 631 (acknowledging the varying
level of scrutiny applied to a substantive due process challenged based on the
type of right that has been infringed upon).
292.
See id. at 638 (“When intensified scrutiny applies, the government
action that harmed claimant is presumed to be unconstitutional and
respondent has the burden to prove that the government action is supported
by substantial justification.”).
293.
See id. (“[T]he conduct was undertaken for a purpose that is
legitimate and compelling (very important) and the conduct comprises a
substantially effective method for achieving that purpose.”).
294.
See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled on other
grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (stating enumerated
rights “found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” are valid claims
against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
295.
See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(recognizing historical teachings and basic values of society as appropriate
limits on substantive due process claims).
296.
See Ayotte, supra note 50, at 1001 (discussing the two major
frameworks unenumerated fundamental rights are considered under, ordered
liberty and rooted in history).
297.
See Galloway, supra note 262, at 638 (“[T]he conduct was undertaken
for a purpose that is legitimate and compelling (very important) and the
conduct comprises a substantially effective method for achieving that
purpose.”).
298.
See id. at 643 (describing infringements that do not violate
fundamental rights as only requiring a rationality review).
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simply asks if the statute is supported by a conceivable purpose
and arguably furthers the purpose. 299 The government action is
presumed constitutional. 300 The system is predictable: statutes
evaluated under rational review are almost always upheld and
statutes evaluated under strict scrutiny are almost always
struck down. 301 Finding an unenumerated fundamental right to
bodily autonomy requiring strict scrutiny is essential to
protecting LGBTQ children.
3. A Fundamental Right to Bodily Autonomy Extended to
Children Exists
This Note has considered the history and development of
children’s rights, the concepts of emancipation and mature
minor tests, case law putting limitations on parental rights
(especially when potential harm for the child was present or
medical decisions were made), and the idea that the right to
bodily autonomy is not magically bestowed upon “adults” at the
age of maturity. This Note posits that a right to bodily autonomy
exists for mature minors. This right to bodily autonomy should
undoubtedly protect LGBTQ children from governmental action
that is medical in nature and endangers the mental and
physical well-being of children. 302
299.
See id. (acknowledging rational review as the least searching means
of scrutiny).
300.
See id. at 643–44 (“If rationality review applies, the government
action is presumed to be constitutional, and claimant has the burden of
proving that the deprivation is not even an arguably rational method for
furthering any conceivable valid governmental interest.”).
301.
See Matthew Grothouse, Implicit in The Concept of Ordered Liberty:
How Obergefell v. Hodges Illuminates the Modern Substantive Due Process
Debate, 49 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1021, 1057 (2016) (suggesting the tiered
scrutiny framework of substantive due process has a determinative analytical
framework, which makes the issue over fundamental rights the crux of the
framework).
302.
This Note does not argue for equal protection for LGBTQ children on
the basis of their LGBTQ identity. Equal protection claims for LGBTQ
individuals have received rational basis review and not been granted a
heightened level of scrutiny. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–33 (1996)
(using rational basis review to invalidate an initiative that allowed
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
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As stated previously, unenumerated fundamental rights
are protected by the Constitution when the fundamental rights
are implicit to ordered liberty or rooted in history. 303 Ordered
liberty and deeply rooted historical tradition are the two
paramount substantive due process considerations; however,
these considerations do not act as a simply applied two-prong
test. 304 Often substantive due process considerations are based
on a totality of the circumstances and other competing
considerations, such as evolving national values. 305
The approach based on deeply rooted national history is
designed to confine judicial scrutiny to historical circumstances
that remain outside of the subjective scope of political and policy
preferences. 306 The judicial exercise of locating a deeply rooted
historical basis has vacillated between considering recent
history and ancient history, often in an outcome-determinative
analysis lacking objectivity. 307 Substantive children’s rights
may lack an ancient historical basis, 308 but within the United
303.
See Grothouse, supra note 301, at 1059 (stating the approach to
substantive due process respects history and tradition in guiding the inquiry,
but those notions do not set an outer boundary in which the past alone could
rule the present notions of liberty).
304.
See Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85
N.C. L. REV. 63, 66 (2006) (noting that the theory of historical tradition and
the theory of ordered liberty have dominated substantive due process
considerations, but that substantive due process considerations are
controversial and a doctrine in disarray).
305.
See id. at 66–69 (suggesting various considerations are applied to
substantive due process, often outcome determinative, which has led to other
emerging theories such as the theory of evolving national values).
306.
See Grothouse, supra note 301, at 1059 (“This approach recognizes
that judicial nullification of democratically-passed laws must not turn on the
political preferences or policy judgements of nine (and possibly five) unelected
and unaccountable Justices.”).
307.
See Eric Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 329,
332 (2013) (“Originalist judges approach the theory eclectically, drawing on
useful historical or textual evidence to support a desired conclusion.”).
Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130 (1973) (tracing abortion history to
the ancient Persian, Greek, and Roman empires), with Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (recognizing recent history of changing ideals and
norms, which recognize same-sex relationships).
308.
See discussion supra Part II.A. (discussing historical concept of
children as property and lacking any rights).
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States’ history, children have enjoyed fluctuating levels of
rights, especially in regards to personal autonomy. 309
Ordered liberty recognizes fundamental rights based upon
issues of self-determination and personal autonomy. 310 The
ordered liberty theory, in conjunction with the theory of
historical tradition, of fundamental rights has provided for the
right to use contraceptives, 311 the right to terminate a
pregnancy, 312 the right to refuse medical treatment, 313 the right
to engage in consensual sodomy, 314 the right to marry a person
of a different race, 315 and the right to marry a person of the
same-sex. 316 Although the establishment of each of those rights
considered both ordered liberty and historical tradition, all had
highly contested theories of historical tradition. 317 As the Court

309.
See discussion supra Part II.D.2. (discussing the expansion of minor’s
emancipation to provide autonomy in employment and contractual abilities).
310.
See Grothouse, supra note 301, at 1060–61 (“Such ‘privacy rights’ and
‘liberty interests’ embrace all conduct essential to an individual’s
self-determination . . . .”) (citations omitted).
311.
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (recognizing personal decisions relating to contraception
are protected within the interests of liberty under the Due Process Clause).
312.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (recognizing the right of
women to make decisions affecting their future, including abortions under the
Due Process Clause).
313.
See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)
(recognizing a right to refuse medical treatment within the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause’s liberty interest).
314.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (recognizing
homosexual consensual sexual relationships as a choice central to personal
dignity and autonomy that would be protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
315.
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing the right to
marry a person of a different race is within the framework of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
316.
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (recognizing to
deny same-sex couples the right to seek marriage diminishes their
personhood, thus the right for same-sex couples to marry is within the Due
Process Clause’s guarantee of liberty).
317.
See Grothouse, supra note 301, at 1062 (stating a substantive due
process right can be found even when a deeply rooted history is not present);
see also cases compared in footnote 307 (suggesting the historical tradition
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considered the concept of ordered liberty in Obergefell, various
factors such as autonomy, agency, and the sanctity of personal
decisions were considered. 318 The Obergefell opinion began, “The
Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty
that includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a
lawful realm, to define and express their identity.” 319
Establishing a fundamental right for children to have bodily
autonomy, when the child is a mature minor, may be a large
step jurisprudentially, but appears to be a logical step forward,
given the case law regarding both blood transfusions and
abortions for minors. 320
Competing fundamental rights exist, however, within the
suggested right to bodily autonomy for children framework. As
previously acknowledged, both the enumerated right to freely
exercise religion and the unenumerated right of parental
authority are competing rights and could be used as possible
compelling state justifications for limiting children’s bodily
autonomy. 321 Therefore, a hierarchy of fundamental rights is
necessary to provide a framework for application of children’s
fundamental rights, which makes the analysis more complex
and unreliable. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court chose not to
address the similar conflict of individual rights in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission 322 by
framework is outcome determinative and may use recent versus ancient
history or specific versus broad contexts).
318.
See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594–97 (recognizing to deny same-sex
couples the right to seek marriage diminishes their personhood and dignity by
creating stigma that limits liberty in personal autonomy); see also Pavan v.
Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078–79 (2017) (expanding the perceived limitation of
liberty in Obergefell to include same-sex parental recognition).
319.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593.
320.
See discussion supra Part II.C.2–D.1 (providing legal background for
children utilizing a right to bodily autonomy in the context of blood
transfusions and abortions).
321.
See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the coupling of religious
rights and parental rights to compete with children’s rights).
322.
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138
S. Ct. 1719, 1727–28 (2018) (analyzing whether store owners may refuse
service to LGBTQ individuals when claiming religious freedom exemptions
and violations of First Amendment protections).
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remanding it the lower court without addressing the scope or
allowable application of religious exemptions. 323 Although the
Supreme Court’s recognizing a fundamental right to bodily
autonomy for children would provide an immediate remedy for
children in the foster care system, a fundamental right would
not protect all children from destructive parental authority and
is likely not the most efficient route to provide effective remedy
for LGBTQ children harmed by parental actions.
C. Partial Emancipation: An Inapplicable Dream or Possible
Reality to Protect LGBTQ Children’s Choices
Partial emancipation with continued child support ensures
that the “best interest of the minor” and financial security are
maintained, which are generally a state’s goals. 324 Some
statutes state that a capability of financial independence is all
that is necessary to obtain partial emancipation, not that
financial independence must already have been realized. 325 The
idea that parental rights and obligations must sever uniformly
has already been questioned through child custody statutes. 326
If parental rights and obligations are considered completely
intertwined, decisions made in the best interest of the child may
become impossible. 327
The explosion of emancipation statutes starting in the
1960s has been influenced by the changing circumstances in
323.
See id. at 1732 (“The outcome of cases like this in other circumstance
must await further elaboration in the courts, all in the context of recognizing
that these disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect
to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to
indignities . . . .”).
324.
See Barnett, supra note 172, at 1819 (addressing that promoting the
minor’s best interest and financial soundness of policy are the state’s priority
goals).
325.
See id. at 1820 (asserting that some statutes and Diamond suggest
managing financial affairs refers to the capability to manage affairs not
current ability to be self-supportive).
326.
See id. at 1821 (comparing to child custody where parental rights of
visitation and control are severed, but parental obligations of support remain).
327.
See id. at 1822 (stating the goal of terminating parental rights to
protect the child and continuing parental obligations to protect the child are
not mutually exclusive).
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parent-child relationships in the United States. 328 Children are
growing up faster with societal and technological changes. 329
The stereotypical nuclear family has become more uncommon
as fewer people get married and divorce rates grow. 330 Modern
family constructs have necessitated the liberalization of family
law concepts. 331 Strict application of emancipation is
experiencing cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsas lex. 332 Moving
forward, when courts consider emancipation, the main issue
should be the purpose for which the minor seeks
emancipation. 333
The notion that emancipation and child support are
mutually exclusive is still commonly held with partial
emancipation viewed skeptically. 334 Most courts view the
inability of children to be financially self-supportive as
dispositive in an emancipation decision because parental
support is still necessary. 335 The ability for a child to emancipate
while
still
receiving
child
support
is
considered
double-dipping. 336 Although parental authority to make
harmful decisions for LGBTQ children is problematic, this Note
328.
See id. at 1829 (emphasizing changing familial and societal dynamics
as the cause for the growth in emancipation issues).
329.
See id. (addressing technological shifts, starting from the post-World
War II era, as a major factor for children maturing at a younger age).
330.
See id. at 1830 (analyzing the shift in familial composition such as
the birth rate for unmarried women going from five percent in 1958 to forty
percent in 2011).
331.
See id. at 1831 (discussing various areas of family law that have
evolved and molded to the current needs of families such as the dissolution of
fault-based divorce).
332.
See id. at 1834 (suggesting that as the original reason for
emancipation has ceased, the law itself will also cease if it does not modernize).
333.
See id. at 1835 (suggesting a primary inquiry for future issues
surrounding emancipation).
334.
See id. at 1811 (acknowledging a majority view that emancipation
and child support will not be granted together).
335.
See id. at 1813 (confirming emancipation cases form a historic pattern
of either granting emancipation or granting child support, but not affirming a
need for both).
336.
See id. at 1811 (discussing criticism of partial emancipation as
“having their cake and eating it” when children are granted both emancipation
and child support).
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does not purport to suggest LGBTQ children should become
financially independent to be able to obtain bodily autonomy.
LGBTQ children are already more likely to become homeless
and to lack financial support structures. 337 Therefore, requiring
LGBTQ children to obtain financial independence for
emancipation to be able to make self-affirming choices is
unrealistic. Partial emancipation may apply in similar ways as
the judicial bypass, where for a specific decision a minor will
need to be partially emancipated to make that decision in their
best interest.
D. A Mature Minor Exemption and Procedural Judicial
Bypass: The Logical Path Forward
The Supreme Court has suggested the interests of a mature
minor shall be considered in the context of an abortion. 338 The
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees a
minor a hearing before a judge who must accept the minor’s
decision if the minor is determined to be mature. 339
When an LGBTQ eighteen-year-old, legally an adult, can
stop her parent’s attempt to force medically harmful decisions
such as conversion therapy or withdrawal of hormone therapy
treatment, but an LGBTQ seventeen-year-old, legally a minor
but days shy of turning eighteen, lacks authority over her bodily
autonomy regarding similar medically harmful decisions, the
legal procedures determining maturity become questionable.
Although bright-line age requirements have a place in the legal
context, potentially harmful medical decisions implicating
bodily autonomy is not a time where age requirements appear
337.
See James, supra note 209, at 176 (highlighting both the rate which
transgender individuals experience homelessness and the high rate of
harassment within homeless shelters leaving many homeless transgender
individuals without options).
338.
See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (discussing at length Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, which established the mature
minor exemption in the abortion context).
339.
See Burk, supra note 159, at 1355–56 (“Through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a minor is guaranteed a hearing
outside the bounds of her parents’ influence—and the judge must accept the
minor’s decision if the court determines that she is mature.”).
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to be protecting the interests of children or society. 340 In Bellotti,
the Court determined that minors hold a due process right to
bodily integrity in the abortion context. 341 A due process right to
potentially life-altering treatment related to sexual orientation
or gender identity should be similarly held to exist.
Mature minor exemptions vary in requirements and
protections state by state; 342 therefore, a federal mature minor
exemption providing for a judicial bypass procedure is necessary
and should be guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In the absence of a federal mature
minor exemption, states should adopt a mature minor
exemption that adequately protects minors’ interests in all
potentially harmful medical contexts.
In Bellotti, the Supreme Court provided a procedure for a
judicial bypass system for abortions to be decided on a
case-by-case basis. 343 A minor will be given an opportunity to
demonstrate maturity before a court, and if she is not
determined to be mature, she will have to demonstrate the
choice is in her best interest. 344 A minor will submit a form to
340.
See id. at 1356 (“Bright-line age limits may be efficient and
appropriate in many contexts, like drinking or voting laws, but in medial
situations that have much higher personal stakes, such bright line rules seem
less appropriate.”).
341.
See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (“The need to preserve
the constitutional right and the unique nature of the abortion decision,
especially when made by a minor, require a State to act with particular
sensitivity when it legislates to foster parental involvement in this matter.”).
342.
See Burk, supra note 159, at 1363 (“This unclear legal realm has led
state courts to find widely disparate results in similar cases regarding a
mature minor’s right to choose her own treatment.”).
343.
See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647 (“We conclude, therefore, that under state
regulation such as that undertaken by Massachusetts, every minor must have
the opportunity—if she so desires—to go directly to court without first
consulting or notifying he parents.”).
344.
See id. at 647–48 (discussing the procedure and analysis the judge
will afford the minor in determining maturity). The Court stated:
If she satisfies the court that she is mature and well enough
informed to make intelligently the abortion decision on her own, the
court must authorize her to act without parental consultation or
consent. If she fails to satisfy the court that she is competent to
make this decision independently, she must be permitted to show
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request a hearing with the court, which should be prioritized
with a short time frame. 345 The judge would then determine if
the minor proved maturity or, at least, best interest. 346 The
system should be designed with a rebuttable presumption that
minors fifteen years old and younger are immature and those
sixteen and older have a rebuttable presumption of maturity. 347
Factors such as academic performance, intellectual capacity,
future plans, and an ability to handle personal finances are all
factors that may contribute to a determination of maturity. 348
However, the most salient factor is the minor’s ability to discuss
the medical procedure, understand the risk, and make the
choice without external pressures. 349 If the afore stated
presumptions are adopted, the burden of proof should be a
showing of clear and convincing evidence to overturn the
presumption. 350
Given the varied opinions on the judicial standard of
maturity and the burden of proof to establish maturity, a federal
mature minor exemption would provide helpful clarification for

Id.

that an abortion nevertheless would be in her best interests. If the
court is persuaded that it is, the court must authorize the abortion.

345.
See Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass
Hearings, and the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 424–29
(2009) (discussing the general features of the minor’s petition to the court
which will focus on speed and anonymity).
346.
See id. at 429–31 (discussing the standards and factors and judge will
consider while evaluating the maturity and best interest standards).
347.
See Bonny, supra note 168, at 323–24 (suggesting the various
presumptions should be reputable because trial courts are at serious risk for
bias and abuse).
348.
See id. at 324 (discussing various factors that are often considered
such as academic performance and financial stability but suggests a more
specific approach by asking about knowledge of the procedure and ability to
pay for the abortion).
349.
See Burk, supra note 159, at 1371–72 (stating Courts have reached a
general consensus that the ability to discuss the medical treatment, the risks
of the treatment, and to be free of parental and peer pressures are the most
important factors in determining maturity for minors).
350.
See id. at 1371 (discussing various factors and standards that may be
applicable).

SEEKING REMEDIES FOR LGBTQ CHILDREN

685

states attempting to apply the exemption. 351 Mature minor
exemption cases will all be fact specific; therefore, no factor
should be dispositive. 352 However, states should adopt statutes
to recognize the above procedures regarding timeliness, rebuttal
presumptions, potential factors, and burden of proof to create a
holistic approach to determine maturity. A mature minor
judicial bypass may be the only way for a minor to assert her
rights in the face of parental authority figures making medical
decisions. 353 Mature minor judicial bypasses apply in other
contexts, such as abortion. 354 The adoption of a procedural
judicial bypass for mature minors enables the minor to
effectuate claims to bodily autonomy when time is of the essence
to ensure protection. 355
The minor’s decisions should be dispositive if the minor is
determined to be mature, regardless of the parents’ or judges’
personal beliefs on whether the decision is the “right”
decision. 356 If the minor is determined to be immature regarding
the decision at hand, the minor can provide an argument for his
or her best interests. After these steps, the judge may still limit
the parent’s conception of the child’s best interest, if the decision
is outside of the constitutional limits established by Prince. 357 If
351.
See id. at 1371–72 (“There are many opinions about the proper
judicial standard used to define maturity; the standard of proof for such
determinations has varied depending on the court adjudicating the elements
of informed consent.”).
352.
See id. at 1372 (“Because every case would be different, no single
factor or set of factors should be considered dispositive to finding maturity.”).
353.
See id. (“A bypass system will not only help a mature minor get an
appropriate hearing, it will also help expedite her opportunity to assert her
legal rights.”).
354.
See discussion supra Part II.D.1 (analyzing the mature minor judicial
bypass system provided in Danforth).
355.
See Burk, supra note 159, at 1373 (“A bypass regime would allow for
a full inquiry into a minor’s maturity level without having to wait for the full
workings of an appeals process. This would be especially useful if the minor’s
wishes conflicted with those of her parents.”).
356.
See id. at 1384–85 (“The bypass system should remove the normative
and paternal religious influence that judges currently possess and put the
power back into the hands of the individual.”).
357.
See id. at 1373 (“When the minor is determined to be incapable of
making a mature choice, the decision of the parents should prevail as long as
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the parent’s decision is seen as a decision that “martyrs the
child,” the judge through the state’s parens patriae authority
will make the ultimate decision. If a parent’s decision regarding
the medical treatment of an LGBTQ minor directly increases
the chance of suicide, the judge will need to exert parens patriae
authority in a mature minor exemption hearing. 358 Although the
mature minor judicial bypass is not an easy path for LGBTQ
children, especially given each individual judges’ autonomy, this
is the remedy that is the most logical outgrowth of the current
children’s rights framework.
V. Conclusion
This Note argues that the state has authority to exert
parens patriae authority when parents threaten their child’s
health and safety regarding LGBTQ status. This is similar to
exertions of parens patriae to protect children in the blood
transfusion and vaccination context. 359 A child’s mental and
physical health is directly threatened in non-affirming
households. When parents require LGBTQ children to endure
conversion therapy treatment or stop ongoing hormone therapy,
harm to LGBTQ children occurs. 360 Although the state could
exert the authority against any parent, when foster parents,
acting on behalf of the state, make non-affirming decisions in
the upbringing of LGBTQ children, the state has a duty to exert
parens patriae authority to defend the children. 361
State statutory schemes, such as those in Texas and
Mississippi, which provide authority for foster parents to act in
their decision remains within the constitutional confines established by Prince
v. Massachusetts.”) (citations omitted).
358.
See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the various increase
suicide risks for LGBTQ individuals).
359.
See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (emphasizing states have the option
to exert parens patriae authority to protect any LGBTQ youth).
360.
See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the various increase
suicide risks for LGBTQ individuals).
361.
See discussion supra Part IV.A (highlighting the need for the states
to exert parens patriae authority to protect LGBTQ youth within the foster
care system).
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potentially detrimental ways by seeking religious freedom
protections are unconstitutional. 362 This Note further posits
that children have a constitutionally protected substantive due
process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. 363 If the state
is unwilling to recognize its duty to protect children from harm,
children must be able to fight against harmful state action
under a fundamental rights framework.
LGBTQ children living with biological parents would be
unable to assert a substantive due process claim against the
state through the Fourteenth Amendment. 364 The state is less
likely to intervene in matters that occur within the inner
sanctum of the family. 365 Therefore, LGBTQ youth living with
non-affirming families may seek partial emancipation or a
mature minor exemption for relevant decisions, specifically
issues regarding medical bodily autonomy. 366 Partial
emancipation and mature minor exemptions are recognized at
varying levels among the states, which may limit broad
applicability. 367 All states should be encouraged to enact
protective partial emancipation or mature minor exemptions for
LGBTQ children. Further, partial emancipation and mature
minor exemptions require some level of maturity or
independence of children, which will also limit broad
applicability for protection of all LGBTQ children.
This Note suggests four potential solutions for LGBTQ
children to seek redress from harmful parental action in the age
of religious exemptions. However, each of the four remedies has
obvious limitations and practicability issues. As the legal
362.
See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing the discriminatory
religious exemptions that have been applied to child welfare services).
363.
See discussion supra Part IV.B (discussing a minor’s claim for a
substantive due process right over bodily autonomy).
364.
See discussion supra Part IV.B (discussing the limited applicability
to the Due Process claim).
365.
See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the privacy and
autonomy of parents within the home).
366.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.–IV.D (discussing mature minor
exemptions and partial emancipations as possible remedies for LGBTQ
youth).
367.
See discussion supra Part IV.C–IV.D (discussing the limitations of
mature minor exemptions and partial emancipations for LGBTQ youth
seeking to assert their bodily autonomy).
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framework for children’s rights continues to develop, one of the
remedies addressed may become a more concrete pathway for
LGBTQ children to seek redress from destructive parental
authority.

